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SHOULD STATE CORPORATE LAW DEFINE SUCCESSOR 
LIABILITY?: THE DEMISE OF CERCLA'S FEDERAL 
COMMON LAW 
Bradford C. Mank· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the 1980s and early 1990s, a series of decisions broadly 
interpreting the liability provlSlons . of the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCIA)I appeared destined to transform corporate law practice.2 
CERCIA does not directly address successor liability, but the statute's 
complex and contradictory legislative history arguably implies that 
Congress wanted federal courts to apply broad liability principles to 
achieve the statute's fundamental remedial goal of making polluters and 
their successors pay for cleaning up hazardous substances.3 Notably, a 
number of courts rejected state corporate law principles that usually 
limit the liability of successor corporations and instead adopted 
expansive federal common law standards to make successor 
corporations liable under CERCIA.4 Courts applying a federal 
common law of successor liability argued that their approach would 
* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati; B.A., 1983, Harvard University; J.D., 1987, Yale 
Law School. I wish to thank participants in the University or Cincinnati Corporate Law Symposium on 
March 9, 2000 for their helpful comments. All errors or omissions are my responsibility. 
l. Su Pub. L. No. 95-510,95 Stat. '2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 
(1994)) [hereinafter CERCLA]. 
2. Su gmeral{y Lynda J. Oswald & Cindy A. Schipani, CERCU and /he "ErosiDn" of Traditional 
CorfJorak Law Doctrim, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 259 (1992). 
3. Su infta note 27 and accompanying text. 
4. Compare B.F. Goodrich v. Bc:tkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 519 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying federal common 
law of successorliability in CERCLA case), det!JingpetiliDnfor reh'g, 112 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1997) and United 
States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478,486-87 (8th Cir. 1992) (same) and United States v. 
Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 837-38 (4th Cir. 1992) (same) and Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. 
Asarco Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1990) (same) and Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex, 
851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Clr. 1988)(same)wilhAtchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Brown & Bryant, 
Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 362-65 (9th Cir. 1998) (arguing in dicta state law should govern corporate successor 
liability in CERCLA cases and not federal common law) and Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls Inc., 922 
F.2d 1240, 1245-47 (6th Cir. 1991) (applying state law of successor liability in CERCLA case and expressly 
rejecting use offederal common law). Su also Vincent E. Gentile, Should StaJt or Federal Common Law DeJmnine 
CERCU Succt.rsor LiabiJi9l?, 21 MERGERS &AcQuIsmONSL. REP. (BNA) 708 (May 31, 1999) (arguing state 
law is not displaced by federal common law in area of corporate successor liability); Gregory C. Sisk & 
Jerry L. Anderson, TIu Sun &ls on Federal COTTUTWn Law: Corporak Succt.rsor LiahiJi91 Under CERCU AjIer 
O'Meiveny & Myers, 16 VA. ENVfL. L.J. 505, 522-24 (1997) (same); David E. Dopf, Federal Common Law 
or StaJt Law?: The NInIh Circuit To1r.e.r on Succwor liIlbiJi9 Under CERCU in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe 
Railway Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 10 VILL. ENVfL. LJ. 171 (1999) (same). 
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achieve greater national uniformity and avoid the danger of state laws 
that supposedly unduly limited the liability of successor corporations.5 
Additionally, while some courts adopting a federal common law 
standard for successor liability applied the "mere continuation" doctrine 
used in most states, other courts have endorsed the expansive 
"substantial continuity" doctrine (also called the "continuity of 
enterprise" exception) applied in a minority of states because it better 
serves CERCLA's broad remedial goals.6 On the other hand, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected the use of 
federal common law in this area because it concluded that state 
successor liability principles generally did not interfere with CERCLA's 
basic liability requirements.7 
Much of the controversy about whether courts should apply a federal 
common law of successor liability or follow state law depends on the 
broader principle of when it is appropriate for federal courts to use 
federal common law standards to displace state law.8 Before 1994, there 
was a plausible argument for applying federal common law to successor 
liability issues. In 1979, the Supreme Court in United States v. Kimbell 
Foods developed a three-part test for determining whether to use federal 
common law in lieu of state law.9 The first two portions of the test, 
whether the issue in question required a nationally uniform body oflaw 
and whether applying state law would interfere with important federal 
policies, arguably supported a federal common law of successor liability 
that would be both more uniform and more readily achieve CERCLA's 
broad liability goals. \0 The third test, whether using federal common 
law would interfere with existing commercial relationships based on 
state law, was ignored by most courts addressing the liability of successor 
corporations under CERCLA. 11 The third prong of Kimbell suggested 
that it may be inappropriate to apply federal common law standards if 
corporate successors had relied upon limited successor liability doctrines 
in state law. 12 Most federal courts placed more emphasis on the need for 
national uniformity and achieving CERCLA's remedial goals, and, 
therefore, applied federal common law standards of successor liability 
in CERCLA cases. 
5. See infta notes 81, 115-19 and accompanying text. 
6. See infta notes 60-62, 71 and accompanying text. 
7. See infta notes 161, 165-71, 168, 180 and accompanying text. 
8. See discussion infta Part III. 
9. See irifra notes 88-92 and accompanying text. 
10. See iii. 
11. See id. 
12. Steid. 
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However, in 1994, the Supreme Court, in O'Melveny & Myers v. 
FDIC, 13 clarified the authority offederal courts to establish common law 
that displaces state law by limiting its use to situations where "there is a 
'significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use 
of state law.",I4- In 1998, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit concluded in dicta that a federal common law of successor 
liability for CERCLA was clearly inconsistent with the reasoning in 
O'Melueny.15 First, the mere continuity approach to successor liability 
used in most states does not so "significandy conflict" with CERCLA to 
justify the extraordinary remedy of displacing state law. 16 Additionally, 
O'Melveny rejected the view that the government is en tided to an 
expansive federal common law standard just because the government 
would win more often. 17 Nevertheless, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit has endorsed a federal common law of 
successor liability for CERCLA despite O'Melveny.18 
In 1998, the Supreme Court in United States v. Besifoods,19 addressed 
when a parent cOIporation may be liable under CERCLA for the 
conduct of a subsidiary. In a long footnote, the Court observed that it 
did not want to decide the controversial issue of whether state law or 
federal common law should determine the standards for piercing the 
cOIporate veil.20 However, Besifoods clearly stated that lower courts 
should not use gaps or silence in CERCLA as a basis for rejecting 
fundamental cOIporate law principles.21 The unmistakable message of 
Besifoods is that CERCLA's general remedial purposes are not a basis for 
re-writing the basic doctrines of cOIporate law. 
Because most states follow traditional cOIporate law precepts, Besifoods 
suggests that courts should generally apply state successor liability rules 
in CERCLA cases rather than use federal common law to impose the 
minority substantial continuity rule.22 In the absence of specific 
statutory authority, courts may not use CERCLA's general goal of 
13. 512 U.S. 79 (1994). 
14. [d. at 87 (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)). 
15. See Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 362-65 
(9th Cir. 1998) (arguing in dicta that state law should govern corporate successor liability in CERClA 
cases and not federal common law); in.fra notes 208-19, 263 and accompanying text. 
16. See infta notes 147-161 and accompanying text. 
17. See infta notes 217-18 and accompanying text. 
18. See B.F. Goodrich V. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 519 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying federal common law 
of successorliability in CERClA case), ~pditionfOT rrh;g, 112 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1997); infta notes 226-
235 and accompanying text. 
19. 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998). 
20. See id. at 1885 n.9. 
21. See infta notes 239, 250 and accompanying text. 
22. See infta notes 238-39, 242, 252-56 and accompanying text. 
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making polluters pay to effectuate a revolution in corporate law liability 
principles. 
For environmentalists who favor CERCLA's broad remedial goals, 
the Supreme Court's increasingly restrictive approach to federal 
common law principles and its support for traditional corporate law 
doctrine is likely disappointing. However, state successor liability 
principles do generally prevent corporations from using sham 
transactions to escape CERClA liability.23 There is no evidence that 
states are engaging in a "race-to-the-bottom" to weaken successor 
liability principles to protect corporations from CERClA liability.24 
Thus, while corporate law's preference for limited corporate liability is 
theoretically at odds with CERCLA's broad remedial goals, the demise 
of a federal common law of successor liability is likely to have little 
impact in most CERClA cases.25 
II. SUCCESSOR LlABIU1Y UNDER CERClA 
A. CERCLA's Basic Structure 
In 1980, Congress enacted CERClA to address the growing problem 
of abandoned hazardous waste disposal sites, including the infamous 
Love Canal burial ground located in a residential neighborhood.26 The 
main goals of the statute are to expedite the cleanup of waste disposal 
facilities and to force those responsible to pay.27 CERClA is priI!larily 
a remedial statute that looks backward to force those responsible for past 
dumping to pay for the cost of cleaning up the waste.28 Courts have 
23. See infta notes 47-60 and accompanying text. 
24. See infta notes 169,219 and accompanying text. 
25. See cases cited infta note 81. 
26. See United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1881 (1998); Michael D. Green, Successors and 
CERCLA: The IrnJm:fect Analog to Products LiIlbiJi!y and an AItemtJlizM Proposal, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 897, 900 
(1993); Bradford C. Mank, The Two-HtoduJ DrfWOR ojSiting and Ckaning Up H~ardous Waste Dumps: Can 
Economic Incentives or MttlimiDn S~ IN Monster?, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 239, 243 (1991) [hereinaftcr 
Mank, Dragon]; Curtis J. Busby, Note & Comment, Asset Pln'chases as Potmtialfy lWponsihk PartiM under 
Superfo.nd, 12 BYUJ. PuB. L. 351, 352 (1998); Jacqueline Y. Engel, gyou Pltg, You Ptg: Unknown H~lJTds 
for Successor CorporatUms Under CERCLA, 23 PAC. LJ. 1317, 1317·18 (1992). 
27. See S. REp. No. 96-848, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119; Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1882; 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,7 (1989) ("CERCLA ... imposes the costs of the cleanup on 
those responsible for the contamination."); Green, supra note 26, at 901-03; Mank,Dragon, supra note 26, 
at243-44; Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 511; Busby, supra note 26, at 352; Dopf,supra note 4, at 172-
73; L. De-Wayne Layfield j CERCLA Successor LiabiJi!y, and IN Federal Common Law: lWponding to an Uncertain 
Legal SlIlndard, 68 TEX. L. REv. 1237, 1240-41 (1990); Christopher J. Neumann, Commenl, Successor 
LiIlbili9And CERCLA: The RunaLoayDoctrW ojContinuiJy ojEnterprise, 27 ENVrL. L. 1373, 1378-79 (1997). 
28. See Oswald & Schipani, supra note 2, at 264-65; Lucia Ann Silecchia, Pinning 1M Blome & Piercing 
1M Veil in 1M Mists oj Metaphor: The Supreme Court's New Standardsjor IN CERCLA LiIlbiJi!Y ojPlJTent Companwand 
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often justified their expansive reading ofCERClA's liability provisions 
by relying on the statute's broad remedial goalS.29 To address "orphan" 
sites where it is impossible to find responsible parties who can pay for a 
cleanup, Congress established a public Superfund financed by taxes on 
producers of toxic chemicals to pay for the Environmental Protection 
Agency's (EPA) cleanups if it is impossible to locate those responsible. 
However, because money in the Superfund is always limited, the EPA 
tries whenever possible to make responsible parties reimburse the fund 
for any cleanup expenses.30 
CERClA imposes liability on four broad categories of potentially 
responsible parties (pRPs): (1) persons presendy owning or operating a 
contaminated facility; (2) persons that owned or operated a 
contaminated facility at the time of disposal of a hazardous substance; 
(3) persons arranging for disposal, treatment, or transport of hazardous 
substances; and (4) those persons that transport hazardous substances 
to disposal or treatment facilities. 31 These four classes ofPRPs may be 
liable whenever "there is a release, a threatened release, or a disposal of 
a hazardous substance into the environment.,,32 While CERClA does 
not direcdy establish liability standards, courts have generally read the 
statute to impose strict33 and retroactive34 liability on any potentially 
responsible party. Furthermore, courts have interpreted the statute to 
a Proposal/or LegislaJiu &/orm, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. liS, 124, 128-29 n.65 (1998). 
29. See Silecchia, supra note 28, at 128-29 n.65 (citing cases and commentators favoring broad 
remedial reading of CERCLA); see gmeraJ!y Blake A. Watson, Liberal ConstructWn of CERCLA Under tk 
RemediaJ PurpOSt Canon: HaJJI tk uwer Cuurls T alcen a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 HARv. ENVlL. L. REv. 199,204 
& passim (1996) (discussing whether broad remedial reading ofCERCLA is appropriate). 
30. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(11), 9611 (1994); Richard G. Dennis, LiabiJ~ of Officers, 
Direc/Qrs and SloclrJwlders Under CERCLA: The Castfor Adopting Stale LouJ, 36 VIlL. L. REv. 1367, 1372-73 
(1991); Green, supra note 26, at 901-02; Silecchia, supra note 28, at 125. 
31. See CERCLA, § 107(a)(I)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(I)-(4) (1994) (defining liability of past and 
present owners of properties or vessels contaminated with hazardous substances, as well as transporters and 
.those who arranged for disposal); Dennis, supra note 30, at 1370-71; Oswald & Schipani, supra note 2, at 
268-69; Lawrence P. Schnapf, CERCLA and tk SubsllmtiaJ Conlinui!J Tut: A Unfbing Proposal/or Imposing 
CERCLA LiabiJiJy onASStt Purchastrs, 4 ENVlL. LAw. 435, 441-42 (1998); Busby, supra note 26, at 352; Dopf, 
supra note 4, at 173-74 n.20; Layfield, supra note 27, at 1242-43. 
32. United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 712 (3d Cir. ·1996); Anspec Co. v.Johnson 
Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1242 (6th Cir. 1991); Layfield, supra note 27, at 1241; Schnapf, supra note 
31, at 442-43; Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 511; Dopf, supra note 4, at 172-73. 
33. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1994) (stating that courts should apply the same standard 
ofliability found in section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, which courts have interpreted 
to provide strict liability under both statutes despite the absence of specific statutory language); 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1321 (1994); United States v. Cello-Foil Prods., Inc., 100 F.3d 1227, 1231 (6th Cir. 1996); New York 
V. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985); Silecchia, supra note 28, at 128 n.64; Amanda 
L. Prebble, Casenote, Curporale LouJ Corifines 10 ParmtaJ lUlbili!Y Under CERCLA: United States v. Bestfoods, 
118 S. CL 1876 (1998),67 U. CIN. L. REv. 1357, 1362-63 n.55. 
34. See United Statesv. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997); United Statesv. Northeastern 
Pharm. & Chern. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732-33 (8th Cir. 1986); Prebble, supra note 33, at 1363 n.57. 
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authorize, but not require, the imposition of joint and severalliability.35 
Some courts have allowed PRPs to avoid joint and several liability if 
they can establish that the harm at a site is capable of apportionment, 
but the burden in a section 107 cost recovery action under CERCLA is 
usually on the defendants to prove the divisibility of the harm and that 
there is an appropriate manner in which to apportion damages.36 
Most defenses to CERCLA liability are limited' to exceptional 
circumstances in which contamination was caused by an act of God, act 
of war, or act ofa third party caused the damage.37 Under the statute, 
an owner who purchased property without knowing that it was 
contaminated may claim to be an "innocent owner," but only if the 
purchaser conducted an appropriate inquiry such as an environmental 
'audit before purchasing the property.38 Additionally, in 1996, Congress 
enacted legislation providing qualified liability protection for lenders 
who do not become involved in the management of a facility to 
encourage lenders to finance development of possibly contaminated 
properties.39 
B. Corporate liabiliry Under CERCLA 
Every federal court of appeals to consider the issue has concluded that 
successor corporations may be liable under CERCLA.40 CERCLA 
imposes liability on any "person" who owned or operated a facility at 
35. See United States v. Colorado & Eastern R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1535 (10th Cir. 1995); Busby, 
supra note 26, at 352·53; Neumann, supra note 27, at 1379; Gulino, infta note 94, at 673-74 (citing 
CERCLA cases decided in 1983 and 1984 imposing joint and several liability). 
36. See Colorado & Eos/mlR.R. Co., 50 F.3d at 1535; Schnapf,supra note 31, at 443. In a section 113 
contribution action, a responsible party generally has the burden of establishing the liability of other guilty 
parties. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(Q (1994); Centerior Service Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal 
Corp., 153 F.3d 344,348 (6th Cir. 1998). 
37. See CERCLA, § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(I)-(3); Oswald & Schipani, supra note 2, at 266; 
Dopf, supra note 4, at 174 n.21. 
38. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A), (B); ASTM Standards on Environmental Site 
Assessments for Commercial Real Estate, E 1527-97, Third Edition; Oswald & Schipani, supra note 2, at 
266-67; Brian C. Walsh, Seeding the Brownfolds: A Proposed S/aJu/e Limiting Environmmtalliflhil~for ProspectWe 
Purchasers, 34 HARV.j. ON LEGIS. 191, 197 (1997). 
39. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 960 I (20)(A) ("The term 'owner or operator' ... does not include a 
person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership 
primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility."); § 960 I (20)(E) Qimiting lender liability); 
William W. Buzbee, Brownfolds, Enuironmmlai Federalism, and instiJutiJJTUJi Detmninism, 21 WM. & MARY 
ENVTI.. L. &POL'yREV. I, 14 (1997). 
40. See B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 50S, 514 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Mexico Feed 
& Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478, 486-87 (8th Cir. 1992); Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 
1245-47 (6th Cir. 1991) Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asareo Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1990); 
Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex, 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1988); Schnapf, supra note 31, at 
454-56; Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 512 n.47; Dopf, supra note 4, at 175 n.25. 
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the time of disposal of hazardous waste.41 CERCLA defines "person" 
as including "corporations.,,42 Although CERCLA does not define 
"corporation," successor liability is such a well understood principle of 
corporate law that courts have concluded that Congress must have 
assumed that the term "corporation" includes successor corporations.43 
For instance, the United States Code generally defines the words 
"company or association" to include "successors and assigns."44 
Accordingly, the term "corporation" in CERCLA presumably applies 
to any organization that is so defined by relevant state laws, including 
successor corporations.45 
Furthermore, successor liability furthers CERCLA's goal of making 
polluters pay. Because they benefited from the economic successes of 
their predecessors, successor corporations should bear the costs for any 
harms resulting from hazardous waste disposal by the predecessor.46 
C. Basic Principles of Corporate Successor Liabiliry 
1. The Majority View: The Mere Continuation Doctrine 
Under the common la~, to promote the free alienability of property, 
a bona fide purchaser of corporate assets that pays reasonable value and 
acquires them in good faith is usually not liable for the selling 
corporation's debts.47 Because many state statutes impose a statute of 
41. &e CERCLA, § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 511. 
42. CERCLA defines "person" as "an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, 
consortium,joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, commission, 
political subdivision ofa State, or any interstate body." CERCLA, § 101(21),42 U.S.C. § 9601(21); Sisk 
& Anderson, supra note 4, at 511; Dopf, supra note 4, at 175. 
43. &e B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 518 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that "federal law provides 
a rule of construction that when the word 'company' or 'association' is used, it 'embrace[s] the words 
'successors[sic) and assigns of such company or association."'); M~o Feed & &ed, 980 F.2d at 486 
("Congress must have considered the word 'corporation' [In CERCLA] to inherently include corporate 
successors."); Anspec Co. v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1245-47 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding 
CERCLA applies to successor corporations, as defined by state law); Schnapf, supra note 31, at 455-56; 
Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 512 n.47, 526. 
44. See 1 U.S.C. § 5 (1994); Schnapf, supra note 31, at 456; Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 512 
n.47. 
45. See Schnapf, supra note 31, at 456; Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 512; Dopf, supra note 4, 
at 175. 
46. See, t.g., M~o Feed & Seed, 980 F.2d at 487; Louisiana-Pacific CO. V. Asareo, Inc., 909 F.2d 
1260, 1262 (9th Cir, 1990); Smith Land & Improvement Corp. V. Cclotex, 851 F.2d 86, 92 (3d Cir. 1988); 
Schnapf, supra note 31, at 456; Dopf, supra note 4, at 175-76. 
47. See Ed PetersJewelry Co. v. C &JJeweiry Co., 124F.3d 252,266 (lst Cir. 1997); Schnapf,supra 
note 31, at 443-44; Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 512-15; Busby, supra note 26, at 354; Neumann, 
supra note 27, at 1380. 
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limitations for post-dissolution claims against a dissolved corporation of 
between one and five years,48 if the predecessor corporation dissolves 
after an asset sale, it may become impossible for a future litigant to sue 
the predecessor.49 However, to prevent corporations from using the 
corporate form fraudulently to escape their liabilities, the mere 
continuity doctrine imposes successor liability and thus protects creditors 
of the selling corporation in four circumstances:5o 
(1) the purchasing corporation expressly or impliedly agrees to assume 
the prior company's liabilities;51 
(2) the transaction is essentially a "de facto" consolidation or merger;52 
(3) the purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the selling 
corporation;53 or 
(4) the transaction was a fraudulent attempt to escape liability.54 
48. Su MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ 14.07 and official comment (1997) (recommending a five-year 
statute of limitations for claims against dissolved corporations); Richard L. Cupp, Redesigning SUCCUSOT 
Liab~, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 845, 880 n.202-204 (1999) Qisting statutes oflimitations for post-dissolution 
in many states); Green, supra note 26, at 905-06. 
49. There is a split regarding whether a CERCLA plaintiff may sue a corporation that is validly 
dissolved under state law. Compare Citizens Elec. Corp. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 F.3d 
1016, 1019 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding CERCLAdoes not preeempt state statute limiting time to sue dissolved 
corporation) and Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 817 F.2d 1448, 1451 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(same) with Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Conso!. Fibers, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 822, 826-28 
(N.D. Tex. 1998) (holding CERCLA preeempts state statute limiting time to sue dissolved corporation) and 
Town of Oyster Bay v. Occidental Chern. Corp., 987 F. Supp. 182, 199-200 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (same) and 
United States v. Sharon Steel Corp., 681 F. Supp. 1492, 1495-96 (D. Utah 1987) (same). Su general!! Joel 
R. Burcat & Craig P. Wilson, Post-Dissolution LiabiJi9 ojCorporations and Their SJuueJwlJers Under CERCL4., 50 
Bus. LAw. 1273 (1995). Additionally, some courts that allow suits against a dissolved corporation would 
not allow such a suit where the dissolved corporation has distributed all corporate assets at the time of the 
suit. Su BurlingtonNIJ'fthem, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 828 (CERCLA plaintiff may sue "dead" dissolved corporation, 
but not "dead and buried" dissolved corporation that has already distributed its assets); Sharon, 681 F. 
Supp. at 1498-99 (same); but see Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. Cleveland, 72 F.Supp.2d 1373, 1381-84 
(M.D. Ga. 1999) (former owner may be held liable under act even if properly dissolved under state law and 
it has already distributed its assets; that defendant may be judgment proof does not affect its capacity to 
be sued). 
50. See Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1990); Schnapf, supra 
note 31, at 444; Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 514-15; Busby, supra note 26, at 354-58; Neumann, 
supra note 27, at 1380. 
51. See Aluminum Co. of America v. Beazer East, Inc., 124 F.3d 551, 555 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding 
asset purchaser expressly assumed predecessor's CERCLA liabilities); Louisiana-Pacific, 909 F.2d at 1263-64 
(stating "the question ofimplied assumption of liability [by an asset purchaser] is a fact specific question"); 
Schnapf, supra note 31, at 445-46; Busby, supra note 26, at 354-55. 
52. Su Louisiana-Pacifo, 909 F.2d at 1262-65 (stating that continuity of shareholders is essential in 
determining whether transaction represents de-facto merger); Schnapf, supra note 31, at 446-47; Busby, 
supra note 26, at 356; Engel, supra note 26, at 1321-22. 
53. See City Management Corp. v. U.S. Chern. Co., 43 F.3d 244, 251 (6th Cir. 1994); United States 
v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478, 487 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Carolina Transformer 
Co., 978 F.2d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 1992); Schnapf, supra note 31, at 447-48; Busby, supra note 26, at 357-58; 
Engel, supra note 26, at 1322. 
54. Su Ci9 MfJlUJlIement Corp., 43 F.3d at 249-54 (finding transaction was not fraudulent where 
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Because the main purpose of these mere continuity exceptions is to 
prevent fraud rather than to always protect creditors, courts have 
narrowly interpreted the exceptions to situations in which it is fairly 
clear that a corporate reorganization is used to defraud creditors rather 
than serve other legitimate interests. 55 Accordingly, courts apply the 
mere continuation rule only to circumstances in which the purchaser is 
virtually identical to the seller. 56 Under the mere continuity standard 
there must be an identity of stock ownership interests, stockholders, 
officers and directors between the purchasing and selling corporation so 
that the sole purpose of the sale appears to be escaping prior liability.57 
Under the mere continuation test, the purchaser is not liable as a 
successor corporation if the ownership interests are different even if it 
maintains the same or similar business operations. 58 Likewise, the 
fraudulent transfer exception applies only when a creditor of the seller 
can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that inadequate 
consideration was paid by the purchaser for the selling corporation's 
assets. 59 
In determining CERClA liability, courts have applied these four 
customary exceptions to prevent selling corporations from evading their 
liabilities through changes in corporate stock ownership that are 
essentially fraudulent or do not alter the selling corporation's 
fundamental form.GO The controversial issue is whether, under 
CERClA, courts should go beyond these four exceptions. 
purchaser paid S720,000 for assets valued at SI million); Schnapf, supra note 31, at 447; Busby, supra note 
26, at 357; Engel, supra note 26, at 1322. 
55. Su Schnapf, supra note 31, at 444; Sisk & Anderson,supra note 4, at 514-15; Engel, supra note 
26, at 1323; Layfield, supra note 27, at 1247. 
56. Su Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 514-15. 
57. Su Ci!Y M~ Carp., 43 F.3d at 251; CIl1P/ina Transf- Co., 978 F.2d at 838 ("[Under] the 
'mere continuation' exception ... a corporation is not to be considered the continuation of a predecessor 
unless, after the transfer of assets, only one corporation remains, and there is an identity of stock, 
stockholders, and directors between the two corporations."); Gentile, supra note 4, at 710; Schnapf, supra 
note 31, at 444; Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 514-15; Busby, supra note 26, at 357-58; Engel, supra 
note 26, at 1322-23. 
58. Su North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon Inc., 152 F.3d 642, 654 (7th Cir. 1998); Carstedt v. 
Grindeland, 406 N.W.2d 39, 41 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that even though the purchasing 
corporation used the same equipment, location, and operations, there was no mere continuation where the 
ownership changed); Gentile, supra note 4, at 710; Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 514 n.58. 
59. Su City Envd., Inc. v. U.S. Chern. Co., 814 F. Supp. 624, 641-42 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (applying 
Michigan law), rHJ'd, 43 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 1994); Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 514-15; Engel, supra 
note 26, at 1322-23. 
60. Su United States v. Mexico Feed & Se~d Co., 980 F.2d 478, 487 (8th Cir. 1992); Anspec Co. 
v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1244-47 (6th Cir. 1~91); Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. 
Celotex, 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1988). 
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2. The Minority Approach: The Substantial Continuity and 
"Product-Line" Rules 
Since 1984, the EPA has sought to convince courts to adopt a federal 
common law standard for successor liability that goes beyond the 
traditional four exceptions under the continuity of enterprise test to 
reach successors "if the new corporation continues substantially the 
same business operations as the [predecessor] corporation.,,61 The 
EPA's 1984 memorandum on successor liability cites decisions from the 
minority of state courts that have abandoned the traditional mere 
continuity rule to impose liability based on either the "product-line 
exception"or substantial continuity ("continuity of enterprise" exception) 
tests.62 In particular, the agency favorably discussed a New Jersey trial 
court decision that had extended the product liability exemption to 
environmental torts and had imposed strict liability on a successor 
corporation for present and previous discharges.63 The memorandum 
concluded that the agency should, as part of its overall litigation 
strategy, seek to convince courts to adopt the substantial continuity 
doctrine in CERCLA cases.64 
a. Product-Line Exception 
Because the four traditional exemptions under the mere continuity 
rule often prevented plaintiffs in tort suits from suing a successor 
corporation that substantially continued the same business, a few states 
have developed a "product-line exception" that finds successor liability 
61. EPA Memorandum from Courtney Price, Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and 
Compliance Monitoring, Liability of Corporate Shareholders and Successor Corporations for Abandoned 
Sites Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) 
11-16 (June 13, 1984) [hereinafter EPA Memorandum]. SeI also Green, supra note 26, at 910-11; Alfred 
R. Light, "Product LW" and "ConIinui!Y oj EnIerprUe" TIwrie.s ojCorporau Successor LiahiJi!y Untkr CERCL4., 11 
MISS. C. L. REv. 63, 66-67 (1990); Kathryn A. Barnard, EPA's Policy ojCorporau Successor Liahili!J Untkr 
CERCL4., 6 STAN. ENVTI... LJ. 78, 78-79, 84-85,103-04 (1986/1987); David C. Clarke, Note, Successor 
Liahili!J Untkr CERCL4.: A Federal Common LawApproa&h, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1300, 1332-33 (1990); 
Neumann, supra note 27, at 1376, 1380. 
62. SeI EPA Memorandum, supra note 61, at 11-16; Green, supra note 26, at 910-11; Light, supra 
note 61, at 67; Barnard, supra note 61, at 78-79,84-85, 103-04; Clarke, supra note 61, at 1332·33; 
Neumann, supra note 27, at 1376, 1380. 
63. SeI Dc:partmentofTransp. v. PSC Resources, Ine., 419 A.2d 1151 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1980); EPA Memorandum, supra note 61, at 13-15 (discussing DeptlTtmmJ ojTransporlmum v. PSC &Sources, 
Inc., 419 A.2d 1151 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980)); Clarke, supra note 61, at 1320·21 (same); hut see 
Barnard, supra note 61, at 103-04 (arguing that PSC Resources is poor precedent because it was decided before 
CERCLA's enactment and that its rationale is largely unnecessary in light of CERCLA). 
64. SeI EPA Memorandum, supra note 61, at 11-16; Green, supra note 26, at 910-11; Neumann, 
supra note 27, at 1376, 1380. 
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on the part of a corporation if it continues manufacturing a defective 
line of products initially produced by the selling entity, but only if it is 
impossible to sue the predecessor corporation.65 As a matter of public 
policy, courts adopting the "product-line exception" have argued that 
it is necessary to protect injured consumers who otherwise could not 
recover.66 
However, a substantial majority of states have rejected the 
"product-line" exception to successor liability for several reasons: (I) 
because the corporate successor has not created the risk of injury from 
the predecessor's sale of defective products; (2) because the successor 
only remotely benefits from the predecessor's sale of a defective product; 
and (3) because the danger that a product-line exception will discourage 
the acquisition of corporate assets.67 
Furthermore, a number of commentators have argued that it is 
inappropriate to apply the "product-line exception" to CERCLA cases 
because other responsible parties or the Superfund itself are available to 
provide an adequate remedy, and the successor usually did not create 
any of the environmental harm at issue.68 Additionally, imposing 
liability on companies that continue manufacturing a defective product 
is more likely to serve deterrent purposes whereas successor liability in 
the CERCLA context often provides no deterrent function because all 
of the disposal may have occurred before the asset purchase.69 
Moreover, it is far more difficult for asset purchasers to estimate the 
potential for CERCLA liability than in the products liability context 
because there are many uncertainties about the location and condition 
65. See Rayv. A1ad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 9-10 (Cal. 1977}; Raimirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 
811,819 (NJ. 1981); Garcia v. Coe Mfg. Co., 933 P.2d 243, 248-50 (N.M. 1997); Dawejko v.Jorgensen 
Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106, 110 (pa. Super. Ct. 1981); Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 388 (Wash. 
1984); Cupp, supra note 48, at 854 n.45; Green, supra note 26, at 906, 908-09; Light, supra note 61, at 68; 
Barnard, supra note 61, at 88-93; Clarke, supra note 61, at 1318-19. 
66. See ~ v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d at 9; DeLapp v. Xtraman, Inc., 417 N.W.2d 219, 221 (Iowa 
1987); Cupp, supra note 48, at 854 n.45; Green, supra note 26, at 906, 908-09; Light, supra note 61, at 68; 
Schnapf, supra note 31, at 449-50; Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 513-14 n.54; Barnard, supra note 61, 
at 94; Busby, supra note 26, at 371-72; Clarke, supra note 61, at 1319; Engel, supra note 26, at 1324-29. 
67. See Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802' F.2d 75, 80-81 (3d Cir. 1986) (applying law of Virgin 
Islands); DeLapp v. Xtraman, Inc., 417 N.W.2d 219, 221 (Iowa 1987) (citing cases}; Green, supra note 26, 
at 909, 913-14; Light, supra note 61, at 69-70 n.32; Schnapf, supra note 31, at 450-51 n.69; Sisk & 
Anderson, supra note 4, at513-14 n.54; Barnard, supra note 61, at 94-1 00; Busby, supra note 26, at371-73. 
68. See City Management Corp. v. U.S. Chem. Co.,43 F.3d 244, 251-53 (6th Cir. 1994); Cupp, 
supra note 48, at 864-66; Green, supra note 26, at 908-36; Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 513-14 n.54; 
Barnard, supra note 61, at 100-102; Busby, supra note 26, at 371-73; Layfield, supra note 27, at 1250-51; 
but see United States v. Western Processing Co., 751 F. Supp. 902, 904-06 (W.D. Wash. 1990) (rejecting 
motion for partial summary judgment on issue of successor liability and recognizing "product-line" theory 
of liability is "viable" under CERCLA); Engel, supra note 26, at 1333-36 (discussing possible use of 
"product-line" liability in CERCLA context). 
69. See Green, supra note 26, at 922-23, 930-31; Layfield, supra note 27, at 1250-52. 
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of wastes and the allocation of cleanup costs varies widely depending on 
the number of parties at a given site.70 
b. Substantial Continui~ OT Continui~ of Enterprise Exception 
Additionally, a minority of states have entirely abandoned the mere 
continuation rule and now impose successor liability whenever the 
purchaser's business operations retain substantial continuity with those 
of the seller even if there is a significant change in ownership.71 In 
applying the substantial continuity test, which is sometimes referred to 
as the "continuity of enterprise" exception, courts have balanced several 
factors in deciding if there is substantial congruity between purchaser 
and seller. For instance, courts have examined whether the purchasers 
produced the same product in the same location; possessed the same 
employees, assets, name, production facilities, or managers; or 
presented itself as a continuance of the seller.72 A court may find a 
substantial continuity of enterprise as long as some of these factors are 
present.73 In particular, some courts have emphasized whether the 
successor publicly represented itself as a continuation of the seller. 74 
However, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions have rejected 
the substantial continuity test for several reasons: (1) the successor 
corporation did not create the risk or liability at issue; (2) the successor 
did not warrant the safety of the product to the public; and (3) the 
successor did not profit from the activity in question.75 
70. Sa Green, supra note 26, at 926-28. 
71. Sa, e.g., United StateS v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 1992); Asher 
v. KCS Int'l, Inc., 659 So. 2d 598, 600 (Ala. 1995); Tumerv. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N. W.2d 873, 883-
84 (Mich. 1976); Kelly v. Kercher Machine Works Inc., 910 F. Supp. 30 (D.N.H. 1995) (applying New 
Hampshire law); Cupp, supra note 43, at 854 n.44; Gentile, supra note 4, at 710; Light, supra note 61, at 
72-73; Schnapf, supra note 31, at 451-53; Sisk &. Anderson, supra note 4, at 516-17; Engel, supra note 26, 
at 1329-33; Neumann, supra note 27, at 1381-82. 
72. Sa United States v. Mexico Feed and Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478, 488 n.10 (8th Cir. 1992); Carolina 
TransfOTmlT Co., 978 F.2d at 838; Gentile, supra note 4, at 710; Light, supra note 61, at 72-73; Schnapf, 
supra note 31, at 452-53; Sisk &. Anderson, supra note 4, at 516-17; Engel, supra note 26, at 1330; 
Neumann, supra note 27, at 1382. 
73. Su Light, supra note 61, at 72-73; Schnapf, supra note 31, at 453; Sisk &. Anderson, supra note 
4,at516-17. 
74. See Trimpc:r v. Harris Corp., 441 F. Supp. 346, 347 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Andrews v.John E. 
Smith's Sons Co., 369 So. 2d 781, 785 (Ala. 1979); Light, supra note 61, at 73; Schnapf, supra notdl, at 
453. 
75. Sa Wallace v. Dorsey Trailers Southeast, Inc., 849 F.2d 341, 343-44 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying 
Missouri law); Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75,82 (3d Cir. 1986) (applying law of Virgin Islands); 
Pancratz v. Monsanto Co., 547 N.W.2d 198,201-02 (Iowa 1996); Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 
N.W.2d 96, 99 (Minn. 1989); Light, supra note 61, at 74-75; Schnapf, supra note 31, at 454; Sisk &. 
Anderson, supra note 4, at 515-16. 
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Moreover, several commentators have argued that applying the 
substantial continuity doctrine in the context of CERCLA is especially 
inappropriate because the successor did not usually create the 
contamination risk, it may be possible to pursue the dissolved 
corporation76 or its former employees who were responsible for 
disposing of the hazardous substance, or that the Superfund provides an 
adequate remedy.77 However, at least one commentator who generally 
opposes adopting the substantial continuity doctrine in CERCLA cases 
would impose such liability if the predecessor is unavailable and the 
successor was aware of the liability.7s 
III. THE BATILE OVER SUCCESSOR CORPORATE UABILITI UNDER 
CERCLA: FEDERAL COMMON LAw OR STATE LAW? 
While courts agree that corporate successors may be liable under 
CERCLA,79 they are divided about whether to follow state law or 
federal common law. For example, the Sixth Circuit has applied state 
corporate law in deciding successor liability.80 However, from 1988 to 
1993, the majority of federal courts addressing the issue adopted a 
federal common law liability standard for successor liability.81 Those 
courts generally argued that it was necessary to apply a federal common 
law standard to prevent restrictive state laws on successor liability from 
interfering with CERCLA's broad remedial goals and to achieve a 
nationally uniform approach to liability under the statute.82 
Nevertheless, courts adopting a federal common law approach are 
76. There is a split in the courts regarding whether a CERCLA plaintiff may sue a dissolved 
corporation. See supra note 49. 
77. See Green, supra note 26, at 920-22 (arguing substantial continuity test should be used in 
CERCLA cases only if predecessor is unavailable and successor was aware of liability); Light, supra note 
61, at 79 (arguing substantial continuity test should not be used in CERCLA cases); but su Schnapf, supra 
note 31, at 457-59 (discussing and disagreeing with criticisms of substantial continuity test in CERCLA 
cases); Watson, supra note 29 at 293-94. 
78. See Green, supra note 26, at 920-22 (arguing substantial continuity test should be used in 
CERCLA cases only if predecessor is unavailable and successor was aware of liability). 
79. See Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 514-15; infta note 81 and aCcompanying text. 
80. See Anspec Co. v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991); infta note 131 and 
accompanying text. 
81. See United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 837 (4th Cir. 1992) (observing 
that "even legitimate resort to state law" may constitute an "evasion by a responsible party" ofCERCLA's 
remedial goals); Kleen Laundry & Dry Cleaning Servs., Inc. v. Total Waste Mgmt. Corp., 817 F. Supp. 
225,233 (D.N.H. 1993) (stating state corporate law doctrine limiting successor liability does not "further 
the goals ofCERCLA"); United States v. Western Processing Co., 751 F. Supp. 902, 905 (W.D. Wash. 
1990) (rejecting state corporate law rules for successor liability because a "more expansive view of successor 
liability under CERCLA fosters a more equitable sharing of remediation costs"); Sisk & Anderson, supra 
note 4, at 515-16. 
82. See Louisiana-Pacific Cf1T/J. infta note 119, at 1263 and accompanying text. 
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divided on whether to follow the mere continuation rule used in a 
majority of states or the more expansive substantial continuity 
standard.83 · A number of federal courts seeking to serve CERCLA's 
broad remedial goals have been attracted by the substantial continuity 
doctrine despite its clear minority status.84 
A.· Kimbell's Three-Part Testfor Federal Common Law 
In 1979, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,ss 
enunciated a three-part test for determining whether courts should 
create a federal common law standard in the· absence of an explicit 
federal statutory standard: (I) whether the question at issue requires a 
nationally uniform body of law; (2) whether application of state law 
would frustrate important federal policies or programs; and (3) whether 
a federal rule would interfere with existing commercial relationships 
based on state law.86 The Court cautioned that courts should not 
invariably "resort to uniform federal rules. ,,87 
The Supreme Court probably intended the Kimbell test to limit the 
creation offederal common law rules.88 However, courts favoring the 
creation of a federal common law have focused on the first two Kimbell 
factors, but have often ignored the third prong regarding whether 
adopting a federal common law approach will disrupt existing 
commercial relationships based on state law.89 
B. Federal Common Law and CERCIA 
Since CERCLA was enacted in 1980, there has been controversy 
about whether Congress intended courts to apply federal common law 
83. Su Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Blosenski, 847 F. Supp. 1261, 1286 (E.D. Pa. I 994)(stating "that 
CERCLA's broad remedial goals will be served by application of the substantial continuity test to 
detennine successor liability of an asset purchaser"); Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 515·16. 
84. Su infta note 125 and accompanying text. 
85. 440 U.S. 715(1979). 
86. Su id. at 728·29; Dennis, supra note 30, at 1441·42; Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 519; Amy 
E. Aydelott, Comment, "CERCL4I.NG"tklssue.s: MakingSenseofConlrf1&tuaJ~ UnderCERCL4, 3 VlLL. 
ENVrL. LJ. 347, 359·60 (1992). 
87. 440 U.S. at 728. 
88. Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 519. 
89. Su, e.g., Kleen Laundry & Dry Cleaningv. Total Waste Management, 876F. Supp.1136, 1141 
(D.N.H. 1994); Gentile, supra note 4, at 711; Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 571 (arguing federal 
common law rule of successor liability interferes with commercial relations under state law in violation of 
Kunbelfs third prong); see gmeraJ!y Dennis, supra note 30, at 1443·1512 (questioning claims of courts that 
uniform federal rule is necessary for CERCLA and arguing that adoption offederal common law rule may 
disrupt commercial relationships under state law). 
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principles to fill the gaps in the statute.90 Proponents of using common 
law principles generally argue that such an approach will serve 
CERCLA's broad remedial purposes of making those responsible for 
waste disposal pay for cleanup costs whenever possible and limiting 
expenditure of the public Superfund money.91 Because CERCLA's text 
and legislative history is poorly written and contradictory, there is 
considerable uncertainty about whether and when Congress intended 
courts to use common law doctrines to interpret the statute's meaning.92 
There is some evidence that Congress intended courts to use common 
law to flil the gaps in CERCLA and to address the statute's broad 
remedial purposes.93 One of the three bills that eventually led to 
CERCLA explicitly referred to joint and several liability, but that 
provision was deleted in the final version of the statute.94 During the 
legislative debates about CERCLA, some members of Congress argued 
that if the bill was enacted courts should follow common law principles 
of joint and several liability even though explicit references to such 
liability had been removed from the statute's text to win over wavering 
votes.95 However, Senator Helms argued that the compromise bill 
foreclosed joint and severalliability.96 
90. CompllIlIJohn Copeland Nagle, CERCLf's Mistokes, 38 WM. & MARy L. REv. 1405, 1444-45 
(1997) (doubting Congress anticipated courts using federal common law to interpret CERCLA: "The 
development of a CERCLA common law, strongly influenced by CERCLA's general purposes, is not as 
inevitable as Watson suggests. "), wiJh Watson, supra note 29, at 291-94 (arguing Congress anticipated courts 
using federal common law to interpret CERCLA). 
91. Sa Watson, supra note 29, at 293-94. 
92. Sa Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1080 (1st Cir. 1986); 
Frank P. Grad, A LtgisltUWe Hiswry of tm ComprehmsWe Environmmtal Response, CompensaJion and Liahilig 
r'Superfond'~ Act of 1980,7-8 COLUM.j. ENVTL. L. I, 1 (1982); Mank, Dragon, supra note 26, at 243; 
Bradford C. Mank, Super.foruJ ConlTaclDrs andAgency Capture, 2 N.V.U. 34, 36 n.7 (1993); Sisk & Anderson, 
supra note 4, at 526 n.131; Setgeneral!Y H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, pt. I, at 1, reprintdin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6119 Oegislative history of CERCLA); Nagle, supra note 90, at 1406-12 (arguing it is difficult to interpret 
CERCLA because statutory language and legislative history are vague and often contradictory). 
93. Sa Watson, supra note 29, at 291-94. 
94. Sa H.R. 7020, 96th Congo § 3071(a)(I)(O)(1980); Silecchia, supra note 28, at 128 n.63; Barbara 
j. Gulino, Note, A RighlofConlrihutiDn UnderCERCLf: 17zeCaseJorFederalCommonLaw, 71 CORNElLL. REv. 
668,672-73 (1986). 
95. Sa 126 CONG. REc. 530,932 (1980) (statement of Sen; Randolph) (stating that "we have deleted 
any reference to joint and several liability, relying on common-law principles to determine when panies 
should be severally liable," and that "issues of liability not resolved by this act, if any, shall be governed by 
traditional and evolving principles of common law," and that an "example isjointand several liability"); 
126 CONG. REC. H31,965 (1980) (statement of Rep. Florio) (concluding that CERCLA imposes strict and 
joint and several liability as detennined by common law principles); Watson, supra note 29, at 293 n.387; 
Gulino, supra note 94, at 671-73 (discussing legislative history ofCERCLA's treatment of joint and several 
liability); but Set Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 527-28 n.136 (arguing Representative Randolph simply 
supported use of "common law" in context of joint and several liability and never advocated general use 
ofJederal common law). 
96. Sa 126 CONG. REc. 530,972 (1980) (statement of Sen. Helms); Gulino, supra note 94, at 673. 
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In United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp.,97 a federal district court in the 
Southern District of Ohio adopted a federal common law approach to 
determining liabili~ under CERCLA. The district court extensively 
discussed CERCLA's legislative history to support the view that 
Congress intended that courts use common law principles, including 
joint and several liability, to interpret the statutory gaps in CERCLA.98 
For example, Representative Florio, a sponsor of the legislation that 
became CERCLA, had explicitly argued that federal courts should 
apply federal common law to determine liability under CERCLA: 
The liability provisions of this bill do notrefer to the terms strict,joint 
and several liability . . .. I have concluded that despite the absence 
of these specific terms, the strict liability standard 'alrefldy approved 
by this body is preserved. Issues of joint and several liability not 
resolved by this shall be governed by traditional and evolving 
principles of common law. The terms joint and several have been 
deleted with the intent that the liability of joint tortfeasors be 
determined under common or previous statutory law .... 
To insure the development of a uniform rule oflaw, and to discourage 
business dealing in hazardous substances from locating primarily in 
states with more lenient laws, the bill will encourage the further 
development of a Federal common law in this area.99 
The district court in Chern-Dyne acknowledged that the deletion of the 
term joint and several liability from the final version of a bill would 
normally preclude courts from interpreting a statute to include that 
approach, but argued that CERCLA was an exceptional case because 
Congress deleted the language so that courts would not impose it in 
every case. 100 Chern-Dyne concluded that a federal common law liability 
standard for CERCLA was consistent with Kimbell's three-part test 
because of the need for national uniformity and the need to protect the 
United States' interest in receiving reimbursement under the statute. lOl 
However, many commentators have argued that Chern-Dyne 
inappropriately relied upon remarks in the legislative history, even by 
sponsors ofCERCIA, that are an insufficient basis to displace state law 
with federal common law when such views are not found in the statute 
or an official committee report that the statute refers to as binding. 102 
97. 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
98. See id. at 805-08. 
99. Id. at 807 (citing 126 CONGo REC. H 11,787 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (statement of Rep. Florio)). 
100. Id. at 807-08. Seealro Gulino, mpra note 94, at 673-74 (citing CERCLA cases decided in 1983 
and 1984 imposing joint and several liability). 
101. Id. at 808-09 (citing United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726, 728 (1979)); 
Aydelott, mpra note 81, a1363. 
102. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n V. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 (1980) 
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In 1986, Congress implicidy ratified Chem-Dyne's approach to liability 
by adopting the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 
(SARA), which amended CERCLA to include an explicit statutory right 
for potentially responsible parties to seek contribution from one 
another.103 Because contribution actions enable one tortfeasor to seek 
reimbursement from others joindy responsible for the harm, SARA's 
explicit recognition of contribution actions implicidy ratified joint and 
several liability under CERCLA, although the precise contours of joint 
and several liability remained unclear. 1M SARA implicidy ratified 
judicial decisions imposing expansive joint and several liability on 
potentially responsible parties and the goal of making the polluter pay. 105 
However, it is uncertain whether Congress' implicit approval of joint 
and several liability was a general endorsement of courts using federal 
common law to interpret CERCLA. 
There are a number of arguments against using federal common law 
to address uncertainties in CERCLA. First, there is some evidence in 
the statu~e's legislative history that Congress did not anticipate that 
federal common law would play a significant part in interpreting 
CERCLA. Notably, one of the statute's primary authors-then-
Representative, now-Vice President Gore--stated, during the legislative 
debate about the limitations period for bringing suit under the statute, 
that state courts rarely employ federal common law and hence that it 
was "improbable" that courts would use federal common law to 
interpret CERCLA. I06 Additionally, most of the congressional 
discussion of the common law was arguably concerned with the use of 
state common law rather than federal common law. 107 Furthermore, it 
is not clear that Congress realized, when it enacted CERCLA in 1980, 
how many gaps there were in the statute and hence that many members 
anticipated the need for federal common law. 108 In Citi.{,ens Eke. Corp. v. 
(" [0] rdinarily even the contemporaneous remarks of a single legislator who sponsors a bill are not 
controlling in analyzing legislative history.''); Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 526-28. 
103. Su H.R. REp. NO. 99-253, § 74 (1986) reprinJed in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835,2856; Niecko v. 
Emro Mktg. Co., 769 F. Supp. 973, 987 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Aydelott" supra note 86, at 363. 
104. Su Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 528. 
105. Su Mank, Dr~, supra note 26, at 244.45; Richard H. Mays, StUkmmts with &4R.4: A 
ComprehmsWe Review ojStUlemenJ Prouduru Under the Superfond AmmdmenJ.r and ~atitmAct, 17 ENVTL. L. 
REP. (ENVTI.. L INST.) 10101-02 n.l2 (Apr. 1987). 
106. Su 126 CONGo REc. H24,343 (1980) (statement of Rep. Gore); I1&corditL at H24,345 (statement 
of Rep. Gore) (observing that cases using federal common law "are infrequent and the precedents too 
disjointed to have a significant impact"); Nagle, supra note 90, at 1444 n.204; Sisk & Anderson, supra note 
4, at 527·28 n.136. 
107. Su Nagle, supra nole 90, at 1444; Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 527·28 n.136 (arguing 
Representative Randolph simply supported use of "common law" in context of joint and several liability 
and never advocated general use ofJtderal common law). 
108. See Nagle, supra note 90, at 1443·44. 
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Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 109 the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion 
authored by Judge Easterbrook, refused to apply federal common law 
to the question of corporate dissolution because there was insufficient 
evidence that Congress intended courts to use federal common law to 
interpret CERCLA. IIO Nevertheless, most judges have been attracted 
by federal common law standards as a way to facilitate CERCLA's 
remedial purposes. 
C. A Federal Common Law of Successor Liabiliry 
1. Justifying a Federal Common Law of Successor Liability 
In the wake of Chem-Dyne and SARA's implicit ratification of a 
common law of strict andjoint and several liability, many federal courts 
were receptive to the argument that federal common law should govern 
the law of successor liability. In 1988, the Third Circuit, in Smith Land 
& Improvement Corp. v. Cerotex Corp., III was the first court of appeals to 
adopt a federal common law standard for successor liability in a 
CERCLA case. Acknowledging that neither the statute nor the 
legislative history specifically addressed successor liability, the Third 
Circuit fell back on the general principle that Congress wanted federal 
courts to use federal common law to address gaps in the statute. Citing 
Chem-Dyne, the Third Circuit in Smith Land held that "[t]he meager 
legislative history available indicates that Congress expected the courts 
to develop a federal common law to supplement [CERCLA].,,112 
Surprisingly, the Third Circuit did not even mention Kimbell's three-
part test. 113 Indirectly, the court followed Kimbell's first two prongs: 14 
First, the Third Circuit justified its implementation of a federal common 
law standard by contending that a nationally uniform test was needed 
to prevent responsible parties from using "a merger or consolidation 
109. 68 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 1995). 
110. See ill. at 1019; Nagle, supra note 90, at 1443-45. 
Ill. 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988). 
112. SmiJhLand, 851 F.2dat 91-92; Sisk&Anderson,supra note 4, at527; Dopf, supra note 4, at 177. 
113. The Third, Eight and Ninth Circuits all failed to cite KlITIIiell. See Anspec Co. v. Johnson 
Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1249 n.5 (Kennedy,J., concurring) ("[I]nexplicably, neither the Third 
Circuit in [SmiJh Land] ... nor the Ninth Circuit in [Louisiana-Pacific], mentioned the [Kunbeli] test. Both 
of those courts concluded, almost without analysis, that a federal common law of successor liability was 
required by CERCLA."); Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 530 (observing that three circuit court decisions 
which adopted a federal common law rule for corporate successor liability under CERCLA (Smith Land, 
Louisiana-Pacific, and Mexico Fud & Sud) did not mention or apply K'unbell lest); Dopf, supra note 4, at 180 
n.57. 
114. Ste Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 529-30. 
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under the laws of particular states which unduly restrict successor 
liability.,,115 Second, the court argued that a federal common law.based 
on the "general doctrine of successor liability in operation in most 
states" was needed because of the danger that "a few states" could apply 
"excessively narrow statutes" that might interfere with CERCLA's goal 
of making responsible parties, including successor corporations, pay 
instead of taxpayers. 116 
In 1990, the Ninth Circuit, in Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 117 
quoted and agreed with Smith Land that Congress intended courts to 
develop a federal common law to supplement CERCLA. 118 Relying on 
Smith Land, the Louisiana-Pacific court argued that a federal common law 
of successor liability was needed to promote national uniformity in 
construing CERCLA and to prevent unduly restrictive state law from 
interfering with CERCLA's liability scheme. 119 If a state law unduly 
limited the EPA's authority to seek reimbursement from a successor 
corporation, then CERCLA's goal of imposing cleanup costs on those 
parties responsible for the contamination might be frustrated and these 
expenses would be borne by the taxpayer, contrary to the statute's 
purposes. 120 
2. A Federal Common Law Based on the Mere Continuity Doctrine 
In Smith Land, the Third Circuit adopted a federal common law 
standard but limited the scope of that standard by concluding that the 
mere continuity successor liability test followed in the majority of 
jurisdictions should set the standard for federal law. 121 The Smith Land 
court stated, "[t] he general doctrine of successor liability in operation in 
most states should guide the court's decision rather than the excessively 
narrow statutes which might apply in only a few states." 122 
In Louisiana-Pacific, the Ninth Circuit also held that the "the 
traditional rules of successor liability in operation in most states should 
115. Smilh Land, 851 F.2d at 92. 
116. Id. 
117. 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990). 
118. 1d. at 1263, 1265-66 (quoting Smilh Land, 851 F.2d at 92) ("the meager legislative history 
available indicates that Congress expected the courts to develop a federal common law to supplement the 
[CERCLA] statute"). 
119. Sa Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, 909 F.2d 1260, 1263 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990); Sisk & 
Anderson, supra note 4, at 530. 
120. Sa Louiriona·Par:ijic, 909 F.2d at 1263 n.2; Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 530. 
121. &e Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Ce10tex, 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988); sa also Sisk & 
Anderson, supra note 4, at 522 (observing Third Circuit was first circuit to endorse federal common law 
in this area). 
122. SmiIh Land, 851 F.2d at 92. 
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govern," or in other words, that the four exceptions under the mere 
continuity rule set the standard for federal common law. 123 Asarco 
failed to raise the fifth exception known as the product-line exception 
and so the Ninth Circuit declined to consider it. 124 Asarco did argue 
that the court should adopt the broader substantial continuity approach, 
but the court did not address the issue because it concluded that the 
successor had not continued the business. 125 
3. A Federal Common Law Based on the Substantial Continuity 
Doctrine 
Subsequently, however, other federal courts have gone beyond the 
majority mere continuity doctrine and have instead adopted the 
minority substantial continuity rule as the standard for a federal 
common law of successor liability.126 They have rejected the mere 
continuation rule by arguing that it makes it too easy for corporations 
otherwise liable under CERCLA to use corporate restructuring to avoid 
liability. 127 
In 1990, the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Kentucky, in United States v. Distier,128 was one of the first courts to adopt 
the substantial continuity doctrine as the standard for federal common 
law principles of successor liability. 129 Because the successor corporation 
was comprised of the same managers, initially produced the same 
products, and served the same customers as the predecessor, the court 
found that there was a substantial continuity and held the successor 
liable under CERCLA for the predecessor's disposal of wastes. 130 
123. Louisiana-Pacifo, 909 F.2d at 1263. 
124. &4i11. 
125. &4 ilL at 1265-66. 
126. &4 B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 515 (2d Cir. 1996); United States V. Carolina 
Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d 
478,488 n.lO(8th Cir. 1992); Atlantic Richfield CO. V. Blosenski, 847 F. Supp. 1261, 1286 (E.D. Pa. 1994) 
(stating "that CERCLA's broad remedial goals will be served by application of the substantial continuity 
test to determine successor liability of an asset purchaser'~; Kleen Laundry & Dry Cleaning Servs., Inc. 
V. Total Waste Mgmt. Corp., 817 F. Supp. 225, 233 (D.N.H. 1993) (stating that mere continuity rule for 
successor liability under state law does not "further the goals of CERCLA"); United States v. Western 
Processing Co., 751 F. Supp. 902, 905 (W.D. Wash. 1990) (Invoking federal common law rule based on 
substantial continuity doctrine because a "more expansive view of successor liability under CERCLA fosters 
a more equitable sharing of remediation costs"); United States V. Distler, 741 F. Supp. 637,642- 43 (W.D. 
Ky. 1990); Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 516 n.65; Busby, supra note 26, at 358·60. 
127. See Mexico Fwl and Sud, 980 F.2d at 488-89; Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 516 n.65; Busby, 
supra note 26, at 358·60. 
128. Disderl, 741 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Ky. 1990). 
129. See id. at 642·43; Schnapf, supra note 31, at 462·63; Clarke, supra note 56, at 1321·24. 
130. DUt/ed, 741 F. Supp. at 643. 
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However, after the Sixth Circuit in a different case rejected the 
substantial continuity doctrine and held . that state law governed 
successor liability under CERCLA, 131 the district court reconsidered and 
vacated its prior decision. 132 
In 1992, the Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Carolina Transformer 
CO.,133 citing Smith Land and Louisiana-Pacific,134 concluded that courts 
should interpret CERCLA to impose successor liability to achieve its 
goals of national uniformity and to prevent responsible parties from 
using lax state laws to avoid liability.135 In adopting successor liability 
under CERCLA, the Fourth Circuit stated that courts "must consider 
traditional and evolving principles offederal common law.,,136 
The Fourth Circuit, in Carolina Transformer squarely faced the issue of 
whether to follow North Carolina's mere continuation rule or instead to 
adopt the broader substantial continuity test used in a minority of other 
jurisdictions as the standard for the federal common law.137 Under 
North Carolina's mere continuity test for successor liability, the 
purchaser, FayTransCo, would not be liable because its ownership 
interests were different from the seiler, Carolina Transformer. 138 The 
District Court in Carolina Transformer adopted the multifactor substantial 
continuity test rather than the mere continuity doctrine. 139 The Fourth 
Circuit adopted the substantial continuity approach in large part 
because "the record as a whole leaves the unmistakable impression that 
the transfer of the Carolina Transformer business to FayTranCo was 
part of an effort to continue the business in all material respects yet 
avoid the environmental liability ... ,,140 
131. Anspec Co. v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991); see infra note 161 and 
accompanying text. 
132. See Distler n, 865 F. Supp. 398,400-01 (W.D. Ky. 1991); Gentile, supra note 4, at 711-12; 
Schnapf, supra note 31, at 463 n.146. Because Ohio was the state of incorporation of both the seller and 
purchaser, the district court on reconsideration vacated its earlier decision and applied Ohio's mere 
continuity" approach to successor liability and concluded that the purchaser was not liable because there 
was not sufficient identity of ownership between the seller and purchaser. See Disller II, 865 F. Supp. at 
400·01. 
133. 978 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1992). 
134. 978 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1992). 
135. See ill. at 838. 
136. It!. at 837-38 (quoting United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988». 
137. See Carolina Transjrnmer, at 837·38; Gentile, supra note 4, at 710-11 (stating Carolina Transjrnmer 
applied "substantial continuity" approach that went beyond North Carolina law, which follows mere 
continuity test); Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 523. 
138. See Carolina Transjrnmer, 978 F.2d at 838; Gentile, supra note 4, at 710-11. 
139. Carolina Transjormn, 978 F.2d at 838. 
140. Id. at 841. 
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In 1992, the Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Mexico Feed and Seed, 1 41 
agreed with other courts of appeals that successor corporations are 
potentially liable under CERClA to prevent evasion ofliability through 
sham corporate transactions and because even good faith successors 
have enjoyed the benefits of their predecessor's disposal of waste. 142 
While the Eighth Circuit did not address whether courts should use a 
state law or federal common law standard for successor liability, the 
court suggested that the district court below was "probably correct" in 
applying federal law because of "the national application of CERCLA 
and fairness to similarly situated parties.,,143 Additionally, the court 
stated that "CERClA must also incorporate the [four] traditional 
doctrines developed to prevent corporate successors from adroitly 
slipping off the hook." 144 
In Mexico Feed and Seed, the district court initially applied the 
substantial continuity test. 145 After favorably discussing cases applying 
that approach, the Eighth Circuit stated that cases imposing the 
substantial continuity doctrine have "correctly focused on preventing 
those responsible for the wastes from evading liability through the 
structure of subsequent transactions." 146 However, the court concluded 
that the substantial continuity rule did not apply because the successor 
corporation included assets from another corporation and was not 
merely a replica of the predecessor's operations with a different 
corporate name. 147 Nevertheless, in dicta, the Mexico Feed court 
suggested that the expansive substantial continuity test was needed to 
insure that responsible parties did not escape their liability.,,'48 
a. Federal Labor Law and the Substantial Continui!J Doctrine 
To justify their application of the broad substantial continuity rule as 
the federal common law standard for determining successor liability 
under CERClA, both the Carolina Transformer and Mexico Feed and Seed 
courts referred to the Supreme Court's use of an expansive substantial 
continuation or "continuity of enterprise" test in a series of labor 
141. 980 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. I 992). 
142. See id. at 486-87 ("Congress could not have intended that those corporations be enabled to evade 
their responsibility by dying paper deaths, only to rise phoenix-like from the ashes, transformed, but free 
of former liabilities."); Busby, supra note 26, at 360. 
143. It!. at 487 n.9. 
144. It!. at 487. 
145. It!. at 487. 
146. It!. at 488. 
147. See United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478, 489-90 (8th Cir. 1992). 
148. See id. at 488-89; Busby, supra note 26, at 360. 
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relations cases. 149 In Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB,150 the Supreme 
Court held that an employer's liability under the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA)151 for wrongful discharge of an employee 
extended to a new entity that had continued the business enterprise and 
retained the same unit of employees. The Court argued that the 
substantial continuation was fair because the purchaser was aware of the 
pending labor issues when it bought the company and could seek a 
lower price to address any liability resulting from pending unfair labor 
practice charges. Several courts have relied on Golden State and 
subsequent cases to justify the substantial continuation doctrine in 
CERCLA successor liability cases. 152 
However, several courts and commentators have persuasively argued 
that it is inappropriate to apply Golden State's "substantial continuity" 
doctrine to CERCLA. Federal courts clearly have the power to create 
federal common law in the labor area because the NLRA is an area 
governed exclusively by federal law. 153 Under the Labor Management 
Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA),154 the Supreme Court has specifically 
recognized the power of federal courts to fashion federal common law 
and preempt state law. 155 By contrast, CERCLA does not preempt 
parallel or more stringent state hazardous waste and cleanup laws. 15 
149. See Mexico Feed and Seed, 980 F.2d at 487-89 (citing Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 
168 (1973»; United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing Fall 
River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 43 (1987»; Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 5.17-
522; Busby, supra note 26, at 370-71. 
150. 414 U.S. 168 (1973); Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 517-522; Busby, supra note 26, at 370-
71; see also Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27,45 (1987) (holding that successor 
employer continuing operations is liable for predecessor's federal labor law violations). 
151. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1994); Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 517-522. 
152. See, t.g.,MexicoFeed&Seed, 980 F.2d at 487-89; Washington v. United States, 930 F. Supp. 474, 
478 (W.D. Wash. 1996); United Statesv. Western Processing Co., 751 F. Supp. 902, 905 (W.D. Wash. 
1990); United States v. Distler, 741 F. Supp. 637, 642-43 (W.D. Ky. 1990); see also B.F. Goodrich v. 
Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 519 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 
27,43 (1987»; Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 838 (same); Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 517-522. 
153. See City Management Corp. v. U.S. Chemical Co., 43 F.3d 244, 253 (6th Cir. 1994); Light, 
supra note 61, at 82-83; Schnapf, supra note 31, at 458 n.125; Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 517-522. 
154. 29 U.S.C. § 141-197 (1994). 
155. SeeJohn Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964); Textile Workers Union v. 
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957); Light, supra note 61, at 80-82. 
156. See Light, supra note 61, at83; Schnapf,supra note, at 458 n.125; Sisk & Anderson, supra note 
4, at 517 -522; see getl6aJ!y42 U.S.C. § 9614 (1994) (a) (CERCLA does not preempt state law), (b) (multiple 
recovery of same costs not allowed under both state and federal law). See, e.g., 415 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 
5122-2; MASS. ANN. LAwS ch. 21E,§§ 1-18 (Law Co-op 1999); N.C.GENSTAT. §§ 130A-310to-310.13; 
RobertH. Abrams, Superfond andtMEvolulWnqfBrownfolds, 21 WM. & MARy ENVTI.. L. &POL'yREv. 265, 
267-68 (1997) (at least forty-five states have statutes similar to CERCLA). 
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b. Does the Substantial Continuiry Doctrine Require a Successor to Have 
Knowledge or a Causal Relationship with the Predecessor Disposal Activities? 
Courts have divided about whether the successor must have had 
knowledge of the predecessor's potential environmental liabilities under 
CERCLA in order to apply the substantial continuity test for successor 
liability. Several courts, including both the Eighth Circuit in Mexico Feed 
and the Ninth Circuit in Louisiana-Pacific, have argued that it is 
inappropriate to apply the expansive substantial continuity test for 
successor liability if the successor had no knowledge of its predecessor's 
potential CERCLA liability for its disposal activities. 157 Mexico Seed and 
some district courts have suggested that this knowledge requirement 
should be read broadly to include successors that should have known of 
the seller's potential liability, but chose to be willfully blind. 158 However, 
some lower federal courts applying the substantial continuity test have 
argued that a su~cessor's lack of knowledge should not bar liability 
because CERCLA's legislative purpose is to reach all private parties that 
have benefited from disposal activities. 159 
157. See Mexico Peed & Seed, 980 F.2d at 489-90 (finding no liability under CERCLA where successor 
had no knowledge of predecessors' disposal activities); Louisiana-Pacific v. Asarco, 909 F.2d 1260, 1265-66 
(9th Cir. 1990) (finding no liability under CERCLA where successor "did not have actual notice of 
[predecessor's] potential CERCLA liability" and successor did not continue slag business); New York V. 
Panex Ind., Inc., No. 94--CV-0400E(H), 1996 WL 378172, at *8 (W.D.N.Y.June 24,1996) (holding 
substantial continuity test "is significantly limited to instances where the circumstances indicate that the 
asset purchaser had actual notice or knowledge of the potential CERCLA liability" (citing Mexico Peed & 
Seetf)); United States v. Atlas Minerals & Chems., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 46, 50 (B.D. Pa. 1993) (stating purpose 
of substantial continuity test is to avoid "strategic behavior by corporate actors who know of or anticipate 
CERCLA problems"); Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 124, 129 (N.D. III. 
1993) (holding substantial continuity test requires that successor have knowledge of predecessor's potential 
CERCLA liability); Gentile, supra note 4, at 710; Schnapf, supra note 31, at 470-71, 476-80; Sisk & 
Anderson, supra note 4, at 566-67 n.393 Qisting cases); but see Gould, Inc. v. A & M Battery and Tire Serv., 
950 F. Supp. 653, 659-60 (M.D .. Pa. 1997) (agreeing with United States v. ,Peirce, Nos. 83-CV-1623, 91-
CV-0039,92-CV-0562, 1995 WL 35601 7, at *3 (N.D.N.¥. Feb. 21,1995) that Mexico Peed & Seed did not 
limit substantial continuity test to cases where purchaser had knowledge or substantial ties to seller). 
158. See Mexico Peed & Seed, 980 F.2d at 489-90 ("Nor is this a case of willful blindness."); Atlantic 
Richfield CO. V. Blosenski, 847 F. Supp. 1261, 1287 n.26 (E.D. Pa; 1994) (suggesting in dicta that "it may 
be proper to reserve substantial continuity successor liability for a purchaser who should have known after 
reasonable investigation of the seller's liability;" however, issue was irrelevant because successor did have 
knowledge of such liability); Atlas Mineralr, 824 F. Supp. at 50 (quoting Mexico Peed & Seed, 980 F.2d at 489-
90). 
159. See Arizona v. ESCO, No. Civ. 93-0937, 1997 WL 259520, at *2 (0. Ariz. Mar. 26, 1997) 
(holding successor could be liable under CERCLA even where it had no knowledge of predecessors' 
disposal activities); Gould, Inc. v. A & M Battery and Tire Serv., 950 F. Supp. 653, 659-60 (M.D. Pa. 
1997); Washington V. United States, 930 F. Supp. 474, 482 (W.O. Wash. 1996) (liThe idea that a successor 
must have knowledge of a potential for CERCLA liability before liability may attach to it, is illogical 
considering CERCLA's policies of strict liability and retroactive liability."); United States V. Peirce, No. 
83-CV-1623, 1995 WI. 356017, at *3 (N.D.N.¥. Feb. 21, 1995) (stating that knowledge of potential 
CERCLA liability by successor is "merely additional factorO to be considered" in determining where to 
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Additionally, courts have divided about whether there must be a 
causal relationship between the successor and the environmental harm 
in order to apply the substantial continuity test for successor liability 
under CERCLA.160 This issue usually arises where the predecessor had 
stopped using the disposal site before the successor's purchase of the 
corporate assets and the issue is whether the successor is liable for the 
waste generated prior to the purchase.161 . . 
D. Courts Adopting the State Law oj Corporate Successorship 
Before the Supreme Court's O'Melveny & Myers decision in 1994, only 
a minority of federal courts chose to follow state law in deciding 
corporate successor liability under CERCLA. In 1991, the Sixth 
Circuit, in Anspec Co. v.Johnson Controls, Inc.,'~2 held that successor 
corporations are potentially liable under CERCLA because Congress 
intended that the definition of "corporation" include successor 
corporations. 163 The majority opinion stated that the district court on 
remand should follow Michigan law in determining successor liability. 164 
In her concurring opinion,Judge Kennedy, agreed with the majority 
that Michigan'S law of successor liability should apply, but stated that 
she wrote separately to address the issue in more depth. While federal 
law ultimately determines CER.CLA liability, state law governs the 
creation and legal status of corporations and therefore the law of the 
state of incorporation should determine the liability of successor 
corporations, "unless the application of that law would conflict with 
federal policy.,,165 . 
Under Kimbell's three-part test, she concluded that state corporate law 
was ordinarily consistent with CERCLA and that there was usually no 
need to displace state law with federal common law in determining 
apply substantial continuity test); Schnapf, supra note 31, at 471.76; Sisk & Anderson, mpra note 4, at 566-
67 n.393 Oisting cases);. 
160. Compare United Statesv. Vermont Am. Corp., 871 F. Supp. 318 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (finding no 
CERCLA liability under substantial continuity test where purchaser did not know of predecessor's disposal 
activities and had no responsibility for disposal activities that ceased five years prior to the purchase) and 
Atlas Minerals, 824 F. Supp. at 48-52 (requiring "causal link between CERCLA defendant and the 
environmental harm"), wiJJa Atlantic Richfic:ld Co. v. Blosenski, 847 F. Supp. 1261, 1286 (E.D. Pa. 1994) 
(Imposing CERCLA liability under substantial continuity doctrine even though no causal link between 
successor and disposal activities); su Schnapf, supra notC 31, at 480-84; Sisk & Anderson, mpra note 4, at 
566-67 n.394 Oisting cases); Neumann, mpra note 27, at 1402·04.. . 
161. See Schnapf, mpra note 31, at 480-84. 
162. 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991). 
163. Id. at 1245·47. 
164. See id. at 1248. 
165. See id. at 1248 (Kennedy,j., concurring). 
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successor liability. 166 Under Kimbell's first prong, she concluded that it 
was not essential to have a uniform federal common law of successor 
liability to achieve CERCLA's goals because state corporate laws on 
successor liability were already relatively uniform. 167 Furthermore, she 
found that "[ n] either the language nor the legislative history of 
CERCLA provides a basis for concluding that the creation of a uniform 
federal common law rule of successorship liability was intended."168 
Under Kimbell's second prong, she argued that there was no evidence 
that applying state successor liability laws would significantly interfere 
with CERCLA's policies; the fact that a uniform federal common law 
might be somewhat more convenient was not enough under Kimbell to 
justify displacing state law. 169 Any fear that states might weaken their 
successor liability laws in the future-"a race to the bottom"-was 
groundless because states have strong interests in protecting their 
citizens and natural resources.17O Under Kimbell's third prong, she 
argued that adopting a federal common law rule would disrupt existing 
commercial law relationships founded on existing state corporate 
successor liability laws. 171 Accordingly, under Kimbell's three prongs, she 
argued that state successor liability laws should determine liability under 
CERCLA. 
In 1994, the Sixth Circuit, in Cig Management Corp. v. U.S. Chemical 
CO.,172 followed Anspec's holding that under CERCLA the liability of 
successor corporations is determined by state corporation law and not 
by federal common law.173 In construing state law, the Sixth Circuit 
concluded that Michigan courts applied the traditional mere continuity 
rule, except in products liability cases, where at least one Michigan 
Supreme Court case had used the broader substantial continuity 
approach.174 Because Michigan courts apply the substantial continuity 
approach only in products liability cases, Cig Management held that it was 
inapplicable in CERCLA cases and, therefore, that the district court had 
erred in applying that doctrine. 175 
In 1993, the First Circuit, in John S. Boyd v. Boston Gas, may have 
implicitly followed Massachusetts' mere continuity rule for determining 
166. Sa iJ. at 1249 (Kennedy,J., concurring). 
167. Sa iLL (Kennedy,1., concurring). 
168. Id. at 1248 (Kennedy,J., concurring). Sa also iLL at 1251 (Kennedy,J., concurring). 
169. Sa iJ. at 1250 (Kennedy,J., concurring). 
170. See iLL (Kennedy,J., concurring). 
171. See iLL at 1250-51 (Kennedy,J., concurring). 
172. 43 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 1994). 
173. Id. at 250-51, 253. 
174. /d. at 251-53 (discussingTumerv. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 877-84 (Mich. 1976». 
175. Id. at 252-53. 
2000] CERCLA. 'S FEDERAL COMMON LA. W 1183 
successor liability under CERCLA. 176 Boyd cited an earlier First Circuit 
decision applying Massachusetts' mere continuity successor liability rule 
in a diversity of citizenship case.177 Boyd stated that a successor 
corporation could be liable under CERCLA only ifit fit within the four 
exceptions of the mere continuity doctrine, but did not explicidy address 
whether it was following state law or using a federal common law 
standard based on the majority mere continuity rule. 178 
E. Under Kimbell the Arguments Jor State Successor Law Are Stronger 
While most federal courts addressing the issue of successor liability 
between 1988 and 1993 invoked federal common law principles,Judge 
Kennedy's concurring· opinion in Anspec, arguing for use of state 
corporate law was the most persuasive of all the CERCLA decisions 
addressing successor liability because she explicidy and carefully 
addressed Ktmhell's three-pronged test. 179 Several cases favoring a federal 
common law of successor liability had argued that a nationally uniform 
approach was needed under CERCLA, butJudge Kennedy showed that 
that contention is weak because state corporate law in this area is 
already relatively uniform. 180 Additionally, she pointed out that cases 
favoring a federal common law of successor liability failed to provide 
any real evidence that any state's law of successor liability was so 
restrictive that it was likely to interfere with CERCLA's purposes.181 
Furthermore, proponents of a federal common law of successor liability 
typically failed to address Kimbell's third prong-whether such an 
approach would interfere with contractual relations under state law. 182 
The best argument for a federal common law of successor liability is 
that it would advance CERCLA's broad remedial purpose of making 
responsible parties pay and that successor corporations should pay 
because they have benefited economically from their predecessor's waste 
disposal activities. 183 While CERCLA's text and legislative history are 
notoriously murky, there is some support for applying the broad 
176. SaJohn S. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401,408-09 (1st Cir. 1993); Sisk&Anderson, 
supra note 4, at 524 n.113. 
177. See Bf!jd, 992 F.2d at 408 (citing Dayton v. Peck, Stow & Wilcox Co., 739 F.2d 690, 692 (1st Cir. 
1984)); Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 524 n.l 13. 
178. Sa Bf!jd, 992 F.2d at 408 (citing Dayton v. Peck, Stow & Wilcox Co., 739 F.2d 690, 692 (1st Cir. 
1984)); Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 524 n.113. 
179. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
180. Sa SmilhLand, supra note III; LuuisUma-Paafo Corp., supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
lSI. Sa id. 
182. Sa SmiJh Land, supra note Ill. 
183. Sa supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. 
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remedial purposes approach. 104 Kimbell's three-part test is arguably loose 
enough to justify the use of federal common law to advance broad 
remedial purposes because it is not clear under its second prong to what 
extent a state law must interfere with a federal law to justify displacing 
state law with federal common law. 105 
There are some additional reasons for questioning a federal common 
law of successor liability. In some areas of corporate and contract law, 
federal courts have usually applied state law principles rather than 
federal common law. IS6 That raises the question of whether courts are 
consistent in applying federal common law to some areas ofCERCLA, 
but not others. For example, many courts, including the Ninth Circuit, 
in a case decided prior to Louisiana-Pacific, have followed state law to 
decide whether a CERCLA claim may be fIled against a dissolved 
corporation. 187 In Louisiana-Pacific, the Ninth Circuit attempted in a 
footnote to distinguish the.earlier case by arguing that it had addressed 
the "capacity to be sued" and that its decision was different from a case 
dealing with the "imposition ofliability.,,188 However, the capacity to 
be sued affects the potential for CERCLA liability; therefore, it is not 
immediately obvious why successor liability is so different that it must be 
decided by federal common law rather than by state law. 189 
Similarly, many courts use state law to interpret contractual releases 
of CERCLA liability that affect private contribution actions. 190 The 
Ninth Circuit in Louisiana-Pacific argued that uniformity was not 
necessary in the contractual release context, but was required in the 
corporate successorship context to enhance the "ability to seek 
reimbursement from responsible parties for cleaning up a hazardous 
waste. site,,191 Yet, corporate successor liability also often affects 
contribution among private responsible parties, and thus some 
184. Su Watson, supra note 29, at 293-94; supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
185. Su supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. 
186. Su Sisk & Andenon, supra note 4, at 530-32. 
187. Su Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr- Richmond Terminal Co., 817 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(holding CERCLA docs not allow suit of corporation validly dissolved under California law); Sisk & 
Andenon, supra note 4, at 530-32; supra notes 161, 171, 175 and accompanying text. 
188. Louisiana-Pacific v. Asarco, 909 F.2d 1260, 1263 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing Levin Metalr 
COTjJ., 817 F.2d 1448). 
189. Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 531. 
190. SuJohn S. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401, 406 (ist Cir. 1993) (applying state law 
to interpret contractual release under CERCI.A); Olin Corp. v. Consol. Aluminum Corp., 5 F.3d 10, 15 
(2d Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Hardage, 985 F.2d 1427, 1433 & n.2 (10th Cir. 1993) (same); 
Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music Corp., Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1459 (9th Cir. 1986)(same); Sisk & Andenon, 
supra note 4, at 531; SN gmeral!J! Aydelott, supra note 86, at 369-72 (discussing Mardon line of cases applying 
state law to contractual releases). 
191. 909 F.2d atl263 n.2. 
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commentators have contended that state law should decide successor 
liability if state law determines liability under release contracts. 192 
Despite the fact that most federal courts addressing the issue of 
successor liability between 1988 and 1993 invoked federal common law 
principles, the intellectual rationale for displacing state corporate law 
was relatively weak. Beginning in 1994, the Supreme Court demolished 
the few remaining arguments for applying federal common law in this 
area. 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT RESTRICTS THE FEDERAL COMMON 
LAw 
In 1994, a unanimous Supreme Court, in O'Meweny & Myers v. 
FDIC,193 clarified the Kimbell Foods test by stating that courts should use 
federal common law to displace state law only in "extraordinary" cases 
in which "there is a significant conflict between some federal policy or 
interest in the use of state law."I94 In O'Meweny, the Court rejected the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC) argument that federal 
law governed the tort liability of a former corporate legal counsel 
accused of professional malpractice and breach offiduciary duty against 
a savings and loan institution that the FDIC had taken over as 
receiver. 195 Because the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and 
Enforcement Act (FIRREA) explicidy preempted state law in other 
areas, the Court refused to find that FIRREA implicidy displaced state 
tort liability rules. 196 
The Court emphasized that "cases in which judicial creation of a 
special federal rule would be justified ... are ... 'few and restricted.'" 197 
The Court stated that "a significant conflict between some federal policy 
or interest and the use of state law" was a "precondition for recognition 
of a federal rule of decision." The Court specifically rejected several 
grounds that are often cited by federal courts to justify use of federal 
common law to determine successor liability. First, O'Meweny stated 
that the advantages of uniformity and convenience alone are not enough 
to justify adopting federal common law rules. 19B Accordingly, O'Meweny 
is inconsistent with cases that justified a federal common law of 
192. Set Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 531. 
193. 512 U.S. 79 (1994). 
194. Id. at 87-89. 
195. Set id. at 80-83. 
196. Set id. at 85-87. 
197. Id. at 87. 
198. 512 U.S. at 88. 
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successor liability because it would promote national uniformity or 
convenience for the EPA. 
Additionally, the mere fact that a federal common law rule would 
enable a federal agency to win litigation more often and thus protect the 
federal deposit insurance fund is not enough of a justification to displace 
state law with a federal common law rule. 199 OMelveny stated: "[t]here 
is no federal policy that the fund should always win .. Our cases have 
previously rejected 'more money' arguments remarkably similar to the 
one made here." Accordingly, OJMelveny is at odds with prior cases that 
have argued a federal common law of successor liability is needed to 
protect the federal Superfund. The Court concluded that the issue 
involved in OJMelveny was "not one of those extraordinary cases in 
which the judicial creation of a federal rule of decision [was] 
warranted. ,,200 
In 1997, the Supreme Court, in Atherton v. FDIC,20I again rejected the 
creation offederal common law in a suit by the FDIC under FIRREA 
to address the standard of care for federal bank officers and directors.202 
While there were clearly differences between state and federal law 
regarding the liability of bank officers, these differences alone did not 
prove that there was such a serious conflict that federal law must 
displace state law because "our Nation's banking system has thrived 
despite [state law] disparities in matters of corporation governance.,,203 
Again, as it had in OJMelveny, the Court emphasized that "[t]o invoke the 
concept of 'uniformity' ... is not to prove its need.,,204 
The Supreme Court's strong rejections of federal common law in 
both OJMelveny and Atherton casts grave doubts on cases that invoked the 
need for national uniformity in CERClA cases to justify a federal 
common law of successor liability. While a uniform federal standard 
would be somewhat more efficient for the EPA to enforce than a series 
of different state standards, state successor liability law is relatively 
uniform.205 The mere continuity rule is the overwhelming majority 
199. Su id. (rejecting FDIC's contention that federal common law standard was needed to prevent 
state law from diminishing deposit insurance fund); Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 533. 
200. Id. at 89. 
201. 519U.S. 213 (1997). 
202. Suid. at 215-17. 
203. Id. at 220. Sualso id. at 218 (explaining, "when courts decide to fashion rulesoffederal common 
law, 'the guarding principle is that a significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use 
of state law ... must be specifically shown"') (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 
68 (1966)). 
204. Id. at 220. 
205. Su infta notes 215-16 and accompanying text. 
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rule.206 Accordingly, it is difficult to argue that state law is so 
inconsistent that a federal standard of successor liability is needed. 
Additionally, O'Melveny clearly rejected the "more money" argument 
of the FDIC and concluded that the goal of safeguarding the federal 
deposit insurance fund is not enough of a justification to displace state 
law with a federal common law rule. 207 Although a federal common law 
based on the substantial continuity approach would yield more money 
to the Superfund, federal courts may not displace state law merely 
because federal agencies would win more often and increase the federal 
treasury. Mter O'Melveny and Atherton, the national uniformity and 
efficiency arguments used to justify a federal common law on successor 
liability in CERCIA cases no longer appear to be valid.208 
v. RETURNING TO A STATE LAw OF SUCCESSOR UABIUTY AFTER 
O'MELVENr AND ATHERTON? 
A. Courts R~ecting Federal Common Law 
1. The Ninth Circuit Retreats from the Federal Common Law 
In 1997, the Ninth Circuit, in Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railwqy Co. 
v. Brown & Bryan~ Inc. ,209 overruled its prior decision in Louisiana-Pacific 
that had established a federal common law of corporate successor 
liability.210 The Atchison court concluded that O'Meiveny and Atherton 
"squarely refute the wisdom offashioning a federal common law on this 
issue. ,,211 Accordingly, Atchison relied on the California law of corporate 
successor liability. 212 
However, the Ninth Circuit issued an amended decision in Atchison 
that replaced its earlier opinion.213 Because Louisiana-Pacific had relied 
upon the same mere continuation approach to successor liability used 
in California as the basis of federal common law, the Atchison court 
concluded that it did not need to decide either the issue of whether to 
use a federal common law approach or whether Louisiana-Pacific 
206. Sa ill. 
207. 512 U.S. 79,88 (1994) (rejecting argument that it should apply federal common law because 
application of state law depletes deposit insurance fund). 
208. See Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 538-43. 
209. 132 F.3d 1295 (9th Cir. 1997). 
210. See Dopf, supra note 4, at 185-90. 
211. Atchison, 132 F.3d at 130 I. 
212. Seeid. 
213. 159 F.3d 358 (9th Cir. 1998) (amending and replacing 132 F.3d 1295). 
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remained good law, because it would reach the same result under either 
state or federal common law.214 Nevertheless, the amended Atchison 
opinion continued to "doubt" whether LJuisiana-Pacific's justification for 
creating a federal common law was valid in light of O'Melveny and 
Atherton. 
First, the amended Atchison opinion questioned LJuisiana-Pacific's 
argument that federal rules of successor liability are justified by a "need 
for national uniformity.,,215 The amended Atchison opinion argued that 
this national uniformity argument was weak because state law is already 
largely uniform on issues of successor liability, following the mere 
continuity rule.216 Indeed, the amended opinion observed that federal 
courts that have attempted to create a federal common law have 
produced a far less certain body oflaw, especially because some courts 
have sought to adopt the minority substantial continuity theory as the 
basis for federal common law.217 . 
According to the amendedAtchison opinion, the only real rationale for 
a federal common law is the desire to impose a broader substantial 
continuity theory in place of the majority mere continuity rule so that 
the EPA and the Superfund prevail more often.218 However,O'Melveny 
clearly rejected the "more money argument.,,219 After O'Melveny and 
Atherton, a court may create a federal common law standard only if state 
law would seriously conflict with federal objectives. The amended 
Atchison opinion found no basis for concluding that state successor 
liability law significantly interferes with federal law. It argued that no 
state "provides a haven for liable companies" and that there is no 
"reason to think that states will alter their existing successor liability 
rules in a 'race to the bottom' to attract corporate business."22o Thus, 
the amended Atchison opinion virtually demolished the arguments for a 
federal common law of successor liability in LJuisiana-Pacific, but did not 
have to actually overrule that prior case. 
214. Id. at 363·64. 
215. Id. at 362 (quoting and questioning Louisiana·Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1263 
n.2 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
216. Ill. at 362. 
217. Id. at 362·63 n.5. 
218. Ill. at 363. 
219. Su supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
220. At&hi.ron, 159 F.3d at 364. 
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2. Redwing Carriers 
In 1996, the Eleventh Circuit, in Redwing Carriers Inc. v. Saraland 
Apts.,221 held that the CERCLA liability of limited partners should be 
determined by state law and not by federal common law standards.222 
Agreeingwith]udge Kennedy's concurring opinion in Anspec CO.,]nc. v. 
Johnson Controls, Inc., 223 that federal common law was not needed to 
prevent states from using lax corporate successor liability standards to 
establish "safe havens for polluters,,,224 the Eleventh Circuit stated that 
her views pertained "with equal force in the context of state partnership 
rules governing the liability of limited partners. ,,225 Accordingly, it is 
likely that the Eleventh Circuit would also reject the use of federal 
common law to determine corporate successor liability.226 
B. The Second Circuit Still Invokes Federal Common Law 
Conversely, in 1996, the Second Circuit in B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski,227 
adopted the substantial continuity approach as the federal common law 
standard for corporate successor liability because that expansive 
doctrine "is more consistent with the Act's goals" and is "superior to the 
older and more inflexible 'identity' rule. ,,228 The Second Circuit did not 
fully articulate why CERCLA's goals require the substantial continuity 
rule, but the case emphasized that prior decisions in that and other 
circuits had concluded that CERCLA is a '''broad remedial statute. ",229 
However, in its initial opinion, the Second Circuit in B.F. Goodrich did 
not even cite O'Melveny or Kunbell.230 
Because the court failed to address these Supreme Court decisions, 
the losing parties petitioned the Second Circuit for a rehearing of the 
case.231 In reviewing the petition for a rehearing, the Second Circuit in 
a brief opinion quoted the three-part Kimbell test and then quoted 
O'Melveny's clarification that use of federal common law is justified only 
221. 94 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1996). 
222. See id. at 1499-1502. 
223. 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991). 
224. See id. at 1248-51 (Kennedy,J., concurring); Redwing Canilrs, 94 F.3d at 1501-02; Sisk & 
Anderson, supra note 4, at 549. 
225. Redwing Catrim, 94 F.3d at 1501-02; Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 549. 
226. See Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 549. 
227. 99 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1996). 
228. Id. at 519; Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 550. 
229. B.F. Goodrich, 99 F.3d at514 (quoting Bi. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1197 (2d 
Cir.1992)). 
230. See itl. at 518-20; Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 550. 
231. See Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 550. 
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where there is a "significant conflict" between federal law and use of 
state law.232 The Second Circuit contended that its prior decision was 
not inconsistent with these Supreme Court cases. Because O'Melveny had 
seriously questioned cases that simply relied on a national uniformity 
rationale for using federal common law,233 the Second Circuit argued 
that it had not impermissibly relied on the convenience of national 
uniformity rather than a real conflict between CERCLA and state 
corporate law. "Although we noted the desirability of uniformity in the 
CERCLA context, our primary reason for adopting a federal common 
law rule was our concern that allowing state rules such as the inflexible 
and easily evaded 'identity' rule to control the question of successor 
liability would defeat the goals ofCERCLA.,,234 The Court argued that 
its decision to apply federal common law in this area was consistent with 
the three-part Kimbell test because "there is a significant need for a 
uniform rule, allowing lenient state law rules to control would defeat 
federal policy, and w'e perceive no danger that our decision to adopt a 
federal rule of 'substantial continuity' will unduly upset existing 
corporate relationships.,,235 However, the Second Circuit failed to 
address similarities between the FDIC's more money argument in 
O'Me[veny and the court's argument that CERCLA's broad remedial 
purposes required an expansive federal common law test. 236 
VI. BEST FOODS 
A. Bestfoods Restricts Derivative Liability for Corporate Parents 
In 1998, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Besifoods,237 addressed 
whether a parent corporation could be derivatively liable under 
CERCLA simply because it participated in or exercised control over the 
operations of a subsidiary that was liable under the statute. The Court 
did not decide the issue of whether courts should use federal common 
law or state law to determine parental liability under CERCLA.238 
However, the Court strongly stated that courts should not use 
CERCLA's general remedial purposes as a basis for rejecting traditional 
232. Set B.F. GOOdrich v. Betkoski, 112 F.3d 88, 90-91 (2d Cir. 1997)(denying petition for rehearing); 
Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 550. 
233. Set supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
234. B.F. Goodrich, 112 F.3d at 91. 
235. [d.; Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 550. 
236. Set B.F. GoodrUh, 112 F.3d at 90-91; Sisk & Anderson, supra note 4, at 550-51. 
237. 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998). 
238. See Silecchia, supra note 28, at 123. 
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corporate law principles. The Court's strong preference for 
fundamental corporate law doctrine suggests that it prefers following 
state law, although its approach could be reconciled with a narrow 
federal common law that follows the corporate law in most states. In 
light of BesifOods, there is no basis for a federal common law of parental 
corporation liability that is dramatically broader than traditional 
corporate liability doctrines such as piercing the corporate veil. 
In BesifOods, the Court, in a unanimous decision written by Justice 
Souter, emphasized that nothing in CERCLA suggests that Congress 
intended to reject fundamental cOIporate law principles. The Court first 
observed that it is a "general principle of corporation law deeply 
'ingrained in our economic and legal systems' that a parent corporation 
... is not liable for the acts onts subsidiaries" merely because it controls 
stock ownership.239 The Court then pointed out that "nothing in 
CERCLA pUIports to reject this bedrock prillciple, and against this 
venerable common-law backdrop, the congressional silence is 
audible.,,240 In light of CERCLA's failure to address the scope of 
corporate liability, a court must presume that Congress intended to 
leave traditional common-law notions of corporate liability in place. 
The Court stated that "the failure of the statute to speak to a matter as 
fundamental as the liability implications ,of cOIporate ownership 
demands application of the rule that' [i] n order to abrogate a common-
law principle, the statute must speak directly to the question addressed 
by the common law. ",241 While the Court did not directly address the 
issue, BesifOods suggests that CERCLA's implicit remedial pUIposes are 
an insufficient justification to reject fundamental corporate law 
principles because only explicit statutory language is enough to preempt 
such basic legal doctrines. 
Under established common-law principles of corporate law, a parent 
corporation's corporate veil may be pierced and the shareholder of a 
parent company may be held liable for a subsidiary corporation's 
conduct "when, inter alia, the cOIporate form would otherwise be 
misused to accomplish certain wrongful purposes, most notably fraud, 
on the shareholder's behalf.,,242 Again, the Court emphasized that 
CERCLA did not purport to change basic principles of veil piercing. 
The Court stated: "[ n] othing in CERCLA purports to rewrite this well-
settled rule, either. ,,243 
239. Besifoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1884. 
240. /d. at 1885. 
241. [d. (quoting Unitcd States v. Tcxas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993}). 
242. [d. ' 
243. Id. 
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In Besifoods, the Court explicitly stated it was not addressing whether 
corporate derivative liability under CERCLA should be decided by stat.e 
law or by federal common law. In a long footnote, the Court cited 
conflicting cases on this issue, noting that "there is significant 
disagreement ... over whether, in enforcing CERCLA's indirect 
liability, courts should borrow state law, or instead apply a federal 
common law of veil piercing."244 The Court found that "the question 
is not presented in this. case" because none of the parties had argued that 
the choice of state as opposed to federal law would affect the parent's 
derivative liability.245 Thus, the Court did not directly address the issue 
of whether courts should apply state or federal rules of parental 
liability.246 
In Besifoods, the Court did hold that a corporation may be liable under 
CERCLA if it violates express provisions in the statute. While 
restricting the possible derivative liability of parent corporations to 
traditional corporate law principles of veil piercing, the Court stated that 
a parent corporation may incur direct "operator" liability if it actually 
manages, directs or conducts operations of the subsidiary'S facility that 
are closely related to pollution producing or waste control activities of 
the subsidiary because such conduct creates liability under the statute's 
express provisions.247 Under CERCLA, an "operator" is defined as a 
person, including a corporation, which manages, directs, or conducts 
operations specifically related to pollution, including the leakage or 
disposal of hazardous substances.248 
Nevertheless, in determining whether the parent's actions were 
enough to create such direct liability, the Court criticized the Dis~rict 
Court below for failing to recognize that it was appropriate under 
established corporate law principles for directors and officers of the 
parent to also serve as directors and officers of the subsidiary without 
automatically incurring liability under CERCLA.249 According to the 
Supreme Court, the District Court had "erroneously, if unintentionally, 
treated CERCLA as though it displaced or fundamentally altered 
common law standards oflimited liability.,,250 The Court rejected the 
imposition of a "relaxed, CERCLA-specific rule of derivative liability 
that would banish traditional standards and expectations from the law 
of CERCLA liability" because "such a rule does not arise from 
244. [d. at 1885 n.9. 
245. /d. 
246. Su Silecchia, supra note 28, at 123. 
247. Besifoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1886. 
248. Su CERClA, § 107(a)(2), 42 V.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(2). 
249. Besifoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1888-89. 
250. /d. at 1889. 
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congressional silence, and CERCLA's silence is dispositive.,,25l Instead, 
courts should examine established "norms of corporate behavior 
(undisturbed by any CERCLA provision) [as] crucial reference points" 
in deciding whether a parental officer's oversight of a subsidiary create 
liability under the statute because these activities "are eccentric under 
accepted norms of parental oversight of a subsidiary's facility.,,252 
B. Does Bestfoods Imply that State Corporate Law Is the Norm? 
Although the Court in BesifOods expressly left open the question of 
whether lower courts interpreting CERCLA should look to traditional 
state corporate law norms rather than federal common law for accepted 
principles governing parental supervision of subsidiaries, some 
commentators have suggested that the Court implied this 
interpretation.253 The general rule is that state common-law principles 
apply unless a federal statute explicidy addresses an issue.254 CERCLA 
is silent about the scope of corporate liability beyond listing corporations 
as within the scope of potentially liable parties.255 While it mainly 
referred to "fundamental" or "common law" principles of corporate law 
rather than explicidy stating that state corporate law governed the issue 
ofparentalliability,256 the Court suggested in one sentence that courts 
should normally follow state law when it stated: "CERCLA is thus like 
many another congressional enactment in giving no indication 'that the 
entire corpus of state corporation law is to be replaced simply because 
a plaintiffs cause of action is based upon a federal statute. ",257 Because 
state corporate law is relatively uniform,258 the Court's freq~ent 
references in BesifOods to "fundamental" or "common law" corporate law 
principles arguably implies that federal courts should normally defer to 
state corporate law standards unless a state's corporate law significandy 
interferes with a federal statute's explicit provisions. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. 
253. Sa George C. Hopkins, United States v. Bestfoods: T1Ie U.S. Supreme Court Sets New Limits on the 
DirectLiabiJi9 ojParenl Corporationsfor PollutingActs ojSubsidiaries, 29 ENVfL. L. REP. (News & Analysis) 10545-
49 (Sept. 1999); Gentile, supra note 4, at 709 (observing "throughout its decision the Court repeatedly 
deferred to state corporation law principles"). 
254. Sa &ifoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1884-1886 (citing United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) 
("[!] n order to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must speak directly to the question addressed 
by the common law") (internal quotation marks omitted). 
255. Sa supra notes I, 29-34 and accompanying text. 
256. Sa Besifoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1884-1886; supra notes 1,29-34 and accompanying text. 
257. &ifoodr, 1\8 S. Ct. at 1885 (quoting Burksv. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979)); Gentile, supra 
note 4, at 709. 
258. Sa supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text. 
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C. Does Bestfoods Suggest a Limited Federal Common Law Based on Mqjori!J 
State Law? 
On the other hand, Bestfoods may have implicitly adopted a federal 
common law standard of corporate liability based on the majority rule 
in most jurisdictions rather than the law in each state. Arguably, the 
reasoning in Bestfoods is consistent with cases such as Smith Land that 
adopted a federal common law standard based on the majority mere 
continuity theory of successorliability.259 For example, the Supreme 
Court did not cite any Michigan law regarding corporate veil piercing 
even though both the court of appeals and district court had discussed 
Michigan corporate law doctrine.26o Rather, the Court emphasized 
"traditional standards and expectations" regarding corporate law in 
mostjurisdictions.261 The Court could have simply stated that courts 
should follow state corporate law, but instead emphasized that 
CERCLA implicit liability goals do not displace "fundamental" or 
"common-law principles" of corporate law.262 
Even if Bestfoods implies that federal courts should generally follow 
state corporate law rather than create their own federal common law, 
there is still an argument that federal courts should· refuse to enforce 
state law that significantly undermines or subverts CERCLA's 
foundations. 263 Accordingly, if a state totally eliminated established 
exceptions that subject successor corporations to liability if they are in 
mere continuity with their predecessor, a federal court would be justified 
in refusing to follow aberrant state law that would allow corporations to 
use essentially "sham" transactions to escape CERCLA liability. 
In light of its emphasis on using "fundamental" or "common law" 
principles of corporate law, the spirit of Bestfoods is strongly inconsistent 
with cases that attempt to create an expansive federal common law 
standard based on the minority substantial continuity theory of successor 
liability. Furthermore, even if Bestfoods suggests that federal courts may 
look to basic corporate law principles in fashioning a very limited federal 
common law, in most cases state law would provide the same answer. 
For example, in Atchison, the Ninth Circuit did not ultimately have to 
decide the issue offederal common law or state law because the result 
259. Set supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
260. Su Gentile, supra note 4, at 709. 
261. Beslfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1889. Su also Gentile, supra note 4, at 709. 
262. Besifoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1885-89; Gentile, supra note 4, at 709. 
263. Set gennaJ!y Gentile, supra note 4, at 709, 711, 713 (discussing when 'federal common law may 
need to preempt state law that follows minority approach). 
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was the same under both California law and the federal common law 
standard of mere continuity used in Louisidna-Pacific.264 
VII. CONCLUSION 
A s~ries of federal court decisions broadly construed liability under 
CERCLA to achieve the statute's broad remedial goals notwithstanding 
the absence of specific statutory support.265 For example, Chern-Dyne 
concluded that Congress intended joint and several liability to apply in 
most cases despite the fact that the statute's sponsors deleted a specific 
textual provision supporting that approach to win over wavering 
votes.266 In particular, the CERCIAjuggernaut threatened to sweep 
aside traditional corporate law doctrines regarding the liability of 
successor corporations.267 To fulfill CERCIA's broad remedial 
purposes and to provide national uniformity, most courts addressing the 
issue between 1988 and 1993 rejected state law and instead sought to 
create a federal common law of successor liability.268 Kimbell's three-part 
test is sufficiently vague and elastic that there is a reasonable argument 
that the need for a nationally uniform doctrine of successor liability 
justifies using federal common law.269 However, Judge Kennedy's 
concurring opinion in Anspec provided stronger and more persuasive 
reasons for following state corporate laws governing successor liability 
because they are relatively· uniform and do not interfere with 
CERCLA's purposes.270 
O'Melveny and Atherton clarified Kimbell by making it clear that courts 
should invoke federal common law only when state law seriously 
interferes with a federal statute and not merely when federal common 
law is more convenient.27I It is not enough that a federal agency would 
win more often under a federal common law standard or that national 
uniformity under CERCLA is more convenient.272 In light of O'Melveny 
and Atherton, the Ninth Circuit strongly suggested that state corporate 
law should apply in deciding successor liability. 273 However, the Second 
264. Su Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 363·64 
(9th Cir. 1998) (amending and replacing 132 F.3d 1295). 
265. Su supra notes 112, 118 and accompanying text. 
266. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
267. See supra notes 118·21 and accompanying text. 
268. See supra notes 112, 122, 134 and accompanying text. 
269. See JUpra note 133 and accompanying text. 
270. Su supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
271. See supra notes 193, 199 and accompanying text. 
272. Su supra notes 197, 203 and accompanying text. 
273. Su supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
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Circuit managed to evade even O'Melveny's restrictive approach to the 
use of federal common law because the court thought that a federal 
common law adopting the substantial continuity doctrine would best 
serve CERCLA's remedial purposes and avoid the supposed danger of 
state laws that might protect successors using sham transactions to avoid 
CERCLA liability.274 
While it did not direcdy decide the question of whether state 
corporate law or federal common law should supply the standard of 
parental company liability for subsidiaries, Bes!fOods strongly argued that 
fundamental corporate law principles should govern where CERCLA 
is silent. 275 At most, Bes!fOods might tolerate a federal common law based 
on traditional common-law principles of cOIiporate law or the rule 
followed in the majority of states. 276 Bes!fOods strongly implied that there· 
is no basis for radically changing corporate law just to meet CERCLA's 
broad purposes when the statute is silent about a particular liability 
issue.277 Thus, Bes!fOods signaled the end of the view that CERCLA is ",n 
exceptional statute that trumps normal corporate law principles. 
Instead, courts should presume that fundamental rules of corporate law 
apply unless there is a clear indication in CERCLA that Congress 
intended otherwise. . 
As a general rule, courts should apply the relevant state law of 
corporate successorship.278 First, there is no evidence that Congress 
~~C~LAw&~~oo~~~~~~M 
successor liability rules in particular. Second, there is not a significant 
conflict between state laws governing successor lia,bility and CERCLA. 
State laws in this area are relatively uniform.279 Indeed, state corporate 
successor rules are far more uniform than the cacophony of different 
federal common law approaches devised by various federal COUrts.280 
Furthermore, a federal common law approach would potentially 
interfere with existing commercial relationships based on limited 
successor liability.281 
I 
274. See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
275. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
276. See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text. 
277. See supra note 250 and accompanying text. 
278. Assuming state law furnishes the rule of decision for successor liability, there may be questions 
about which state's law should govern. For example, should a federal court apply the law of the state in 
which a corporation is incorporated or where a disposal facility is located? See Gentile, supra note 4, at 711-
13. These issues are beyond the scope of this article. 
279. See supra notes 238-40 and accompanying text. 
280. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
281. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
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While a federal common law based on the substantial continuity 
doctrine would better serve CERCLA's broad remedial goals, it is 
unlikely that following state successor liability principles will significantly 
intenere with the EPA's implementation ofCERCLA.282 First, in many 
cases, federal courts have used the majority mere continuity rule to hold 
a successor liable under CERCLA without needing to invoke the 
substantial continuity doctrine.283 On the other hand, in a few cases 
such as Carolina Transformer, only the substantial continuity approach 
would enable the EPA to reach a successor corporation, but in many of 
these cases it may be possible to sue other potentially responsible 
parties.284 While the agency would prefer that courts adopt federal 
common law based on the substantial continuity doctrine,285 the EPA 
has never presented evidence that using the mere continuity doctrine 
poses a serious problem in a large number ofCERCLA cases. Second, 
as Judge Kennedy argued in Anspec, there is no evidence that states are 
engaging in a "race-to-the-bottom" to weaken successor liability 
principles to protect corporations from CERCLA liability.286 Because 
CERCLA affects only a tiny portion of all cases involving successor 
liability and some firms would be liable even under more relaxed 
successor liability principles, it is unlikely that states would dramatically 
change their successor liability standards to allow any corporation to use 
successor corporations to shield them from liability in a wide variety of 
different contexts just to protect a few firms from CERCLA liability. 
Furthermore, Judge Kennedy pointed out that states have a 
countervailing interest in protecting their environmental and natural 
resources.287 It is improbable that states will engage in a "race to the 
bottom" to weaken the rules of successor liability just to help those few 
companies affected by CERCLA. 
Furthermore, CERCLA's practical significance is waning. In 1986, 
the EPA added 170 new sites to the National Priorities List (NPL), which 
are the sites with the worst contamination problems, and then included 
99 more in 1987.288 By contrast, the agency added eleven new NPL sites 
in 1997 and seventeen in 1998.289 A former high-level agency official 
282. &e supra note 120, 169 and accompanying text. 
283. See Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 363-64 
(9th Cir. 1998) (amending and replacing 132 F.3d 1295). 
284. See Uf. 
285. See Uf. 
286. &e supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
287. See Atchison, 159 F.3d at 363-64. 
288. &eJudithJacobs, Fonner EPA OfficUzl Clay Sees Program Wl1IIiing Down, Wtlh GreaJer RokjorSInJes, 
30 ENV'TREp. (BNA) 1325, 1325 (Nov. 19, 1999). 
289. See itt. 
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has predicted that the superfund program "will wind down in the next 
10 years to a program whose chief function is emergency response. ,,290 
Thus, ten years from now, there are likely to be fewer successor liability 
cases under CERCLA. 
During the 1980s and early 1990s, a number of decisions used 
CERCIA's broad remedial purposes to reject fundamental corporate 
law principles such as successor liability. 29 1 In O'Melveny and Atherton, the 
Supreme Court reined in expansive use of federal common law by 
emphasizing that neither the desire for national uniformity nor "more 
money" for the federal treasury were enough to preempt state law.292 
Courts may invoke federal common law only where state law 
significantly interferes with a federal statl,lte. Besifoods made it clear that 
CERCIA's implicit purposes are not enough to displace fundamental 
corporate law principles. 293 Thus, corporate law's preference for limited 
liability is no longer threatened by CERCLA's broad remedial purposes. 
290. See id. (quoting Don Clay, EPA Assistant Administrator for solid waste and emergency response 
from 1989 to 1993). 
291. See supra notes 97, Ill, 117, 126, 133, 140 and accompanying text. 
292. See supra notes 197, 203, 206 and ac;companying text. 
293. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
